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“A company that is required to undress in public will pay more 
attention to its figures.” 
 —Christopher Cox, SEC Chairman1 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In the summer of 2008, Steve Jobs, the iconic CEO of Apple Inc.,2 
came on stage in San Francisco to make one of his grand product 
announcements.  But, without saying a word, his mere appearance—thin 
and hollowed—sent the company’s stock moving.3  Apple shareholders 
and the marketplace began wondering whether his pancreatic cancer, which 
he was treated for in 2004, had returned.4  The company refused to 
comment on Mr. Jobs’ health condition, stating that it was a “private 
matter.”5  The Securities and Exchange Commission (the “SEC”) rules are 
* Associate, Davis Polk & Wardwell. J.D. University of Pennsylvania Law School.  Cert. in 
Business & Public Policy, Wharton School of Business at the University of Pennsylvania.  
B.A., New York University.  Special thanks to John Agozzino, Anita Allen, Regina Austin, 
Jill Fisch, Kristin Madison and Monica Pal for their comments and criticisms; and thanks to 
many others for helpful conversations on the topic.  The views expressed herein are my own 
and do not necessarily reflect the views of Davis Polk & Wardwell, its partners, or any of its 
other attorneys. 
 1. Eric Dash, More Pieces. Still a Puzzle, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 8, 2007, at A1. 
 2. See JEFFERY S. YOUNG & WILLIAM L. SIMON, ICON STEVE JOBS:  THE GREATEST 
SECOND ACT IN THE HISTORY OF BUSINESS 238-46 (Wiley, John & Sons, Inc. 2005) 
(chronicling in brief the fall and rise of Steve Jobs as a modern day icon and business 
mogul). 
 3. See Jobs’s Job, ECONOMIST, Aug. 2, 2008, at 68 (discussing the effect of Jobs’s 
health on Apple’s financial outlook). 
 4. Id. 
 5. Id. 
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silent on such situations, there is little legal scholarship in this area,6 and 
different companies have varying disclosure practices for executive 
illness.7  Further clouding the matter, a New York Times reporter, after 
having an “off the record” conversation with Mr. Jobs, reported that while 
his health problems were “more than ‘a common bug,’ they weren’t life-
threatening.”8  What is an investor to do with this lack of clarity, this lack 
aterial information? 
Information—accurate, timely information—is at the bedrock of any 
free market.9  The market for publicly traded securities in the United States 
is no exception;10 in fact, it may be the prime example of an information-
intensive and information-sensitive market.11  The federal government, 
through the creation of the SEC and the enactments of the Securities Act of 
193312 and Securities Exchange Act of 1934,13  requires companies with 
publicly traded securities to make fair, timely disclosures of material 
information to the investing public.14  The stated purpose of securities 
laws15 is to “substitute a philosophy of full disclosure for the philosophy of 
caveat emptor.”16  As a result, hundreds of thousands of rules and 
 6. See Peter Elkind & Doris Burke, The Trouble with Steve Jobs, FORTUNE, Mar. 5, 
2008, at 88, available at http://money.cnn.com/2008/03/02/news/companies 
/elkind_jobs.fortune/index.htm (explaining that the SEC has not yet taken action against any 
company for failing to disclose issues about a CEO’s health). 
 7. See Joe Nocera, Apple’s Culture of Secrecy, N.Y. TIMES, July 26, 2008 at C1 
(noting that the chief executive of Intel did not inform shareholders of his prostate cancer 
diagnosis while McDonald’s immediately informed shareholders of its CEO’s colorectal 
cancer diagnosis). 
 8. Id. 
 9. See, e.g., George A. Akerlof, The Market for “Lemons”:  Quality Uncertainty and 
the Market Mechanism, 84 Q. J. OF ECON. 488, 488-90 (1970) (analyzing the importance of 
accurate information through the prism of asymmetrical information in the used automobile 
marketplace). 
 10. See Jeffrey N. Gordon & Lewis A. Kornhauser, Efficient Markets, Costly 
Information, and Securities Research, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 761, 761-67 (1985) (highlighting 
the importance and costs of information in an efficient securities market). 
 11. See, e.g., Victor Brudney, Insiders, Outsiders, and Informational Advantages Under 
the Federal Securities Laws, 93 HARV. L. REV. 322, 341 (1979) (discussing the importance 
of how timely and accurate information in the securities market can lead to enhanced 
resource allocation.). 
 12. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-aa (2000) (originally enacted as Act of May 27, 1933, ch. 38, § 1, 
48 Stat. 74). 
 13. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-nn (2000) (originally enacted as Act of June 6, 1934, ch. 404, § 1, 
48 Stat. 881). 
 14. See Zohar Goshen & Gideon Parchomovsky, The Essential Role of Securities 
Regulation, 55 DUKE L.J. 711, 721 (2006) (“In efficient markets, information about the 
value of firms is incorporated quickly and accurately into stock prices.”). 
 15. Use of the term, “securities law,” in this Article refers to the federal securities laws, 
namely, the Securities Act and the Exchange Act.  See infra Part III. 
 16. See SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 186 (1963). 
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home purchase,23 internet usage habits,24 or financial status?  How about a 
 
regulations—constantly examined and updated—require publicly traded 
companies to disclose everything from key contracts and financial 
statements to employee headcounts and perceived risks.17  While more 
information has become available about publicly traded companies, 
arguably not enough information is available about the people who run 
those companies.  The growing regulatory spotlight on public companies 
has created a penumbra over their boardrooms and executive suites.18  
What does the investing public have a right to know about a company’s19 
executive officers?20  Is a chief financial officer’s divorce settlement21 
material information?  What about a chief executive officer’s sex life,22 
 
 17. See 17 C.F.R. § 229 (2008) (outlining how Regulation S-K under the Securities Act 
of 1933, the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and the Energy Policy and Conservation Act 
‘Sunlight,’ remarked the Supreme Court Justice Louis D. Brandeis, ‘is 
). 
icle refers to such 
, 2003, at 
e to an unceremonious end today, after a British court allowed a U.K. 
C
 Whole Foods CEO, John Mackey, anonymously posted 
of 1975 spell out the various types of information that a public company must disclose in 
their respective filings with the SEC). 
 18. See Elkind, supra note 6 (alluding to the lack of clear guidance from the SEC on 
private but material matters, such as health issues involving public company executives); 
see, e.g., Linda Grant, Shareholder Profit v. CEO Privacy:  Recent Cases Renew Debate 
over Disclosure of an Executive's Illness, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 22, 1993, at D1 (highlighting the 
absence of clarity in securities law for disclosure of executive illness).  See generally Dash, 
supra note 1, at A1 (“
said to be the best of disinfectants.’  One problem with too much sunlight, however, can be 
the blinding glare.”
 19. Use of the term, “company,” in this Article refers to a publicly traded company in 
the United States. 
 20. Use of the terms, “director,” “officers,” or “executive,” in this Art
persons that serve on those publicly traded companies.  See infra Part IV.A (defining the 
relevant persons that are the key subjects for the purposes of this Article). 
 21. See Katherine Yung, Dean Foods Keeps Move in the Open:  Company Says its CEO 
Will Sell Stock to Help in Divorce Settlement, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Aug. 28
2D (Reporting that the chairman and chief executive of Dean Foods Company announced 
that he was selling his shares in the company to facilitate his divorce settlement). 
 22. See Alan Cowell, BP's Chief Quits Over Revelations About Private Life, N.Y. 
TIMES, May 2, 2007 at C1 (reporting on the resignation of a prominent chief executive 
following the public disclosure of his sexual relationship with a gay companion.); see also 
Alex MacDonald, Benoit Faucon & Michael Williams, BP’s CEO to Resign Immediately 
Amid Revelations of Private Life, WALL ST. J., May 1, 2007, available at 
http://tech.groups.yahoo.com/group/safepipelines/message/10107 (“The storied tenure of 
John Browne, the CEO who turned BP PLC into one of the world's most-valuable oil 
companies, cam
newspaper group to publish a set of articles about the executive's long relationship with a 
young man.”). 
 23. See Crocker H. Liu & David Yermack, Where are the Shareholders’ Mansions? 
CEOs’ Home purchases, Stock Sales, and Subsequent Company Performance, SOCIAL 
S IENCE RESEARCH NETWORK, Oct. 17, 2007, http://ssrn.com/abstract=970413 (studying the 
impact of home purchases and stock sales by CEOs on the performance of their companies). 
 24. See David Kesmodel, Whole Foods Sets Probe as CEO Apologizes, WALL ST. J., 
July 18, 2007, at A3 (reporting that
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chief executive officer’s diagnosis of Alzheimer’s disease?  Or a venereal 
disease or other health matters?25  What private information is material to 
the reasonable investor?26  What does material mean in this context?27  
Should the SEC require more disclosure on material, private matters? 
The issue about what types of material, private information should be 
disclosed will be of significant concern to academics and regulators, to 
Wall Street and Main Street, and to corporate titans and average citizens in 
the present and coming years28 as the investing marketplace’s voracious 
need for more information29 confronts the executive’s innate human desire 
to protect it.30  The SEC has been silent on this issue and there has been 
little scholarship on the matter as well, but the changing investing 
landscape of the 21st century requires a critical examination of this issue.  
In 2006, it was reported that some 57 million American households, or 
about half of all American households, have some investment in the stock 
messages on internet chat rooms advocating for his company and thrashing competitors, 
which led to a SEC investigation). 
 25. See Andrew K. Glenn, Disclosure of Executive Illnesses Under Federal Securities 
Law and the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990:  Hobson's Choice or Business 
Necessity?, 16 CARDOZO L. REV. 537, 537-41 (1994) (examining the shortcoming of federal 
securities law concerning the disclosure of executive illness); see also Benjamin Pimentel, 
Public Disclosure:  Health of CEOs Brings up Issues of Personal Privacy, S.F. CHRON., 
Aug. 3, 2004, at C1 (discussing the lack of guidance in terms of what CEOs are required to 
disclose about their health). 
 26. See Mark Maremont, Scholars Link Success of Firms To Lives of CEOs, WALL ST. 
J., Sept. 5, 2007, at A1 (discussing scholarship that studied the private events of CEOs and 
their relationship to company performance). 
 27. See infra Part III.C (discussing the concept of materiality in the context of securities 
law). 
 28. See Letter from Alan Greenspan to Representative Edward J. Markey, (July 28, 
1998), quoted in Toby Lester, The Reinvention of Privacy, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Mar. 2001, 
at 29 (“The appropriate balancing of the increasing need for information in guiding our 
economy to ever higher standards of living, and essential need of protection of individual 
privacy in such an environment, will confront public policy with one of its most sensitive 
tradeoffs in the years immediately ahead.”). 
 29. See Press Release, SEC, SEC Provides Guidance to Open Up Use of Corporate 
Web Sites for Disclosures to Investors (July 30, 2008), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2008/2008-158.htm [hereinafter SEC, Disclosure to 
Investors] (“Ongoing developments in technology have increased both the markets’ and 
investors demand for more timely company disclosure on the Web, and in turn, raised new 
securities law issues for public companies to consider.” (quoting SEC Chairman Christopher 
Cox)). 
 30. See Letter from Alan Greenspan to Representative Edward J. Markey, (July 28, 
1998) quoted in Loretta Nott, Report for Congress, The Role of Information in Lending:  
The Cost of Privacy Restrictions, 1 (2003), available at 
http://www.law.umaryland.edu/marshall/crsreports/crsdocuments/RL31847_05192003.pdf 
(“Too little information that can be used in marketing leads to a decline in the quality of the 
goods and services offered. Too much can be perceived as an inordinate incursion of 
privacy of person.”). 
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on the privacy of 
executives. 
II.  WHY MORE DISCLOSURE? 
 
 
market, through stocks, mutual funds, or retirement plans.31  The growing 
participation of the general population in the securities market will also 
likely increase the desire for more information and the political will to act 
accordingly via legislation and rulemaking.32  In the securities market 
context, a fundamental question must ultimately be answered:  should there 
be more privacy or more disclosure when it comes to material, private 
matters of public company executives? 
This article argues that practical and realistic answers to this question 
favor more meaningful, material disclosure and less privacy for executives 
while working within the existing regulatory framework.33  Structurally, 
my argument proceeds as follows:  Part II will consider why more 
disclosure about the private matters of public company executives may be 
desirable through an examination of the growing investor base, the 
enhanced position of the executive, and the equalizing role of regulated 
disclosure in the modern information age.  Part III will discuss the 
disclosure (and non-disclosure) of private, material matters through the 
prism of the general disclosure obligations under the federal securities 
laws.  Part IV will offer a model approach for disclosing material, private 
matters which works within the current federal regulatory framework and 
imposes limited additional burdens on public companies.  Finally, Part V 
will address some of the key critiques and concerns about additional 
disclosures from executives, namely, those that relate to the burdens of new 
regulations, their impact on companies, and their effect 
Why more disclosure?  This query presumes that more disclosure 
 31. See Richard Cheney, Vice-President of the United States, Remarks at the Chicago 
Mercantile Exchange (June 23, 2006), available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/06/text/20060623-12.html (discussing the 
growth of the American economy and business investment). 
 32. See infra Part II.A (discussing the growing investor base as a reason for more 
disclosure about company executives). 
 33. It can be argued that existing securities law may already require such disclosure.  
However, it is difficult to discern with great certainty whether the drafters of the Securities 
Act intended for the Act to cover private, material matters of executives.  The Act itself is 
silent on that point.  However, the legislative history suggests that the Act was intended to 
cover “the type of information required to be disclosed…by competent bankers from their 
borrowers.”  H.R. REP. NO. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1933).  Arguably, a competent 
banker in 1933 (or presently) would likely find information, such as CEO’s diagnoses with 
Alzheimer’s disease, the type of information that should be disclosed, and reasonable minds 
exercising an abundance of caution can read Regulation S-K to require such disclosures, but 
historically disclosures have not included such private matters. 
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reliable) means,38 regulated principle-based disclosure39 under the current 
 
about public company executives is:  (1) possible and (2) desirable.  The 
first part of the presumption is true; the second part is arguably as true if 
such disclosure is qualified by materiality,34 as is the case with most SEC-
mandated disclosure.35  More material disclosure about executives is 
desirable and perhaps necessary because the current regulatory regime and 
current disclosure practice give a growing base of investors, in an 
increasingly complex marketplace, insufficient information to make sound 
investment decisions.36  Additionally, the role of the executive has 
changed; the enhanced premium that the growing market places on good 
executive officers and the discount it places on bad ones has increased the 
desirability of more material information about executives.37  While such 
information may be garnered through alternative (and sometimes less 
 
 34. See infra Part III.C (discussing materiality in the context of securities law). 
 35. While greater transparency and disclosure from companies can lead to better 
corporate governance, the former does not necessarily guarantee the latter; and “more 
information” as a general principle may not always be desirable if not qualified by 
materiality.  More information in an increasingly complex financial system can overwhelm 
and obfuscate an investor.  See Zachary Karabell, The Myth of Transparency, NEWSWEEK 
(Atlan
rovides.  In short, a company can be fully transparent and still 
isclose 
ares after the company’s disclosure of its founder and chairman suffering a heart 
tt
cutives insist that false information is permeating the marketplace as 
tic Ed.), July 7, 2008, at 47: 
The sheer volume of information that companies provide both in the United 
States and in other countries is so vast that it takes full-time analysts and 
regulators to parse it.  Even then, there is a tacit understanding that much of 
what a company reports has to be taken on faith.  Only if a company is 
investigated by a regulator is it truly possible to discover the veracity of the 
information it p
be fraudulent. 
 36. See Vikram Pandit, Toward a Transparent Financial System, WALL ST. J., June 27, 
2008, at A11 (“Transparency must also include public disclosures to investors about 
pertinent risk and financial information that give the market a chance to make informed 
judgments.”).  Contra Karabell, supra note 35, at 47 (“[E]ven if companies d
everything they are required to and more, they can still deceive and commit fraud.”). 
 37. See, e.g., Daniel Grebler, Companies Should Be Open About Executive Health, 
STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis), Feb. 10, 1993, at 2D (noting the rise of a company’s shares due 
to market uncertainty about an executive’s health status); Kenneth R. Sheets et al., If the 
Boss Isn't Around, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Jan. 19, 1987, at 42 (reporting on the rise of 
MCI's sh
a ack). 
 38. See Stephanie Clifford & Jenny Anderson, S.E.C. Warns Wall Street: Stop 
Spreading the False Rumors, N.Y. TIMES, July 14, 2008, at C1 (“Rumors have long been a 
part of Wall Street’s fabric, and to prove rumor-mongering is a difficult task, especially with 
24-hour news and communications technology like instant messaging and text messaging.  
But Wall Street exe
never before.”). 
 39. Principle-based disclosure under the guidance of the SEC is to be distinguished with 
rigid line-item disclosure, which is useful for objective matters like employee headcount and 
company addresses, but less useful for subjective issues like the material private matters of 
executives.  Principle-based disclosure necessarily allows for greater flexibility due to the 
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efficient, fair market.42 
A.   A Growing and Diverse Investor Base 
 
framework is arguably most cost-effective40 and conducive41 to an 
In the latter half of the 20th Century, the number of securities investors 
in the United States grew significantly, and it continues to grow among 
unsophisticated individual investors.43  This growth of the investor base is 
important to the issue of more executive disclosure because a growing 
investor base of unsophisticated investors makes more disclosure as a 
regulatory safeguard increasingly relevant;44 and consequentially, the 
 
varying significance of each CEO in relation to their companies.  In 2006, the SEC adopted 
principle-based disclosure changes concerning executive compensation.  Press Release, 
SEC, SEC Votes to Adopt Changes to Disclosure Requirements Concerning Executive 
Compensation and Related Matters (July 26, 2006), 
http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2006/2006-123.htm [hereinafter SEC, Changes to Executive 
Compensation Disclosure]; see also Michael Bloomberg & Charles Schumer, Sustaining 
New York’s and the US’ Global Financial Services Leadership, at 89 (McKinsey & Co. 
report, 2007), available at http://www.nyc.gov/html/om/pdf/ny_report_final.pdf 
(“Nevertheless, reliance on principles and judgment over rules and the elimination of 
unnecessary differences in standards (provided that the integrity of the standards is not 
diminished) are two of the themes that should underpin the call for change for many aspects 
of the US regulatory environment.”). 
 40. See Goshen & Parchomovsky, supra note 14, at 716 (“Disclosure duties reduce 
their information gathering costs.  Restrictions on fraud and manipulation simultaneously 
lower information traders’ cost of verifying the credibility of information, and improve their 
ability to make accurate predictions.”). 
 41. See, e.g., Andrea M. Matwyshyn, Material Vulnerabilities: Data Privacy, 
Corporate Information Security, and Securities Regulation, 3 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 129, 199-
200 (2005) (noting that making changes within the existing federal securities law regime 
can minimize costs); Michael P. Van Alstine, The Costs of Legal Change, 49 UCLA L. REV. 
789, 793 (2002) (stipulating that costs are inherent to changes in legal rules); see also SEC, 
Disclosures to Investors, supra note 29 (discussing how clarifying existing rules to account 
for changes in the investing and technological landscape is cost-effective). 
 42. See, e.g., Press Release, Financial Industry Regulatory Authority, Self-Regulators 
Warn Against Spreading False Rumors and Other Abusive Market Activity (Mar. 31, 2008), 
available at http://www.finra.org/PressRoom/NewsReleases/2008NewsReleases/P038211 
(reminding companies of NYSE prohibitions on rumors that affect market conditions); Press 
Release, SEC, Securities Regulators to Examine Industry Controls Against Manipulation of 
Securities Prices Through Intentionally Spreading False Information (July 13, 2008), 
available at http://sec.gov/news/press/2008/2008140.htm (warning against the adverse 
impact of unregulated information sources). 
 43. Cheney, supra note 31. 
 44. Historically, courts, lawmakers and regulators have focused on protecting the 
individual investor.  See, e.g., Schlesinger Inv. P’ship v. Fluor Corp., 671 F.2d 739, 743 (2d 
Cir. 1982) (“The Williams Act was meant to protect the ordinary investor.”); H.R. REP. NO. 
73–85, pt. 1, at 2 (1933) (“The purpose of the legislation . . . is to protect the public with the 
least possible interference to honest business.”). 
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reater political 
capit
on fell into the Great Depression, and the 
worl
patients can exercise their judgment to provide informed consent in making 
growing investor base also gives lawmakers and regulators g
al to promulgate new disclosure requirements to uplift and sustain 
individual investors’ confidence in the securities markets.45 
During the 1920s, approximately 20 million large and small 
shareholders took advantage of post-war prosperity and set out to make 
their fortunes in the stock market.46  Fueled by easy credits, get-rich 
schemes, and irrational exuberance, many investors jumped head-first into 
an unregulated, dangerous marketplace.  It is estimated that, of the $50 
billion in new securities offered during this period, half became 
worthless.47  In 1929, the stock market crashed, losing over half of its 
market capitalization in the span of a few weeks.48  In the aftermath of the 
Great Crash of 1929, the nati
d soon fell into an economic slump.  Millions of jobs were lost, and 
billions of dollars in equities evaporated. 
While only about 20 million investors were invested in the stock 
market in the 1920s, today that number is much larger.  Recent reports have 
shown that over half of American households are now invested in the stock 
market either directly through personal brokerage accounts or indirectly 
through retirement plans.49  A majority of the investors in the early part of 
the 20th century consisted primarily of the wealthy and financially 
sophisticated; whereas today’s investor base is more economically-diverse 
and less sophisticated.  Moreover, these less sophisticated investors are 
making investment decisions in the face of “mounting complexities of 
global trends in business, markets and the economy.”50  Just as doctors are 
required to provide patients with ample material information so that 
a medical decision,51 public companies are required to provide investors 
 
 45. See John Marshall Cook, The Securities Enforcement and Penny Stock Reform Act 
ctant to invest.”). 
, The Investor’s Advocate:  How the SEC Protects Investors, Maintains Market 
t/whatwedo.shtml (last visited Oct. 21, 2008). 
n Mifflin 
quities, Nov. 10, 
2005,
 50
 51
of 1990: The Cost of Flexibility, 6 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 359, 391 n.235 (1992) (“The concept 
of market confidence revolves around the individual investors.  If individual investors are 
not confident that the market is running smoothly, they will be relu
 46. SEC
Integrity, and Facilitates Capital Formation, available at 
http://sec.gov/abou
 47. Id. 
 48. See JOHN KENNETH GALBRAITH, THE GREAT CRASH 1929 88-100 (Houghto
Co. 1997) (1954). 
 49. Investment Company Institute, Half of America Households Own E
 available at  http://www.ici.org/shareholders/dec/05_news_equity_rpt.html. 
. Pandit, supra note 36, at A11. 
. ZeBarth v. Swedish Hosp. Med. Ctr., 499 P.2d 1, 8 (Wash. 1972): 
Informed consent, therefore, is the name for a general principle of law that a 
physician has a duty to disclose what a reasonably prudent physician in the 
medical community in the exercise of reasonable care, would disclose to his 
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backdating by executives57 and perceived excessive compensation 
 
 
with ample material information so that investors can exercise their 
judgment in making an investment decision. 
As with the genesis of federal securities law, the birth of a broader and 
more diverse investor base has resulted in greater political will to enact 
new legislation and regulations to protect unsophisticated investors in the 
marketplace.52  The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 200253 (“Sarbanes-Oxley”) was 
enacted in response to the wave of corporate scandals involving major 
companies, such as Adelphia, Enron, Tyco International and WorldCom, 
which decimated billions of dollars in market capitalization, destroyed 
pension funds, and undermined public confidence in the securities 
market.54  Sarbanes-Oxley was one of “the most far-reaching reforms of 
American business practices since the time of Franklin Delano 
Roosevelt.”55  More recently, in 2006, the SEC adopted new rules to 
require more disclosure on executive compensation.56  The rules were 
adopted partially in response to scandals involving stocks-option 
patient as to whatever grave risks of injury may be incurred from a proposed 
course of treatment so that a patient, exercising ordinary care for his own 
welfare, and faced with a choice of undergoing the proposed treatment, or 
alternative treatment, or none at all, can, in reaching a decision, intelligently 
exercise his judgment by reasonably balancing the probable risks against the 
n . . . is to protect the public with the 
 REV. 881, 882–83 (1988) (highlighting the protection of 
(positing that Congress acted in an imprudent and 
, Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 40 HARV. J. LEGIS. 235 (2003) (providing an 
Fraud in Corporations, N.Y. TIMES, 
ggesting that backdating 
probable benefits.  Failure to impart such information to the patient is by the 
great weight of authority deemed negligence rendering the physician liable for 
injuries proximately caused thereby.  (citation omitted). 
 52. See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 73-1383, pt. 2, at 5 (1934) (discussing the need to protect 
individual investors in an increasing complex financial, economic system); H.R. REP. NO. 
73–85, pt. 1, at 2 (1933) (“The purpose of the legislatio
least possible interference to honest business.”); Ralph K. Winter, On “Protecting the 
Ordinary Investor,” 63 WASH. L.
ordinary investors as a primary goal of securities law). 
 53. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified in 
scattered sections of the U.S.C.). 
 54. See Kathleen F. Brickey, Enron’s Legacy, 8 BUFFALO CRIM. L. REV. 221, 225-28 
(2004) (chronicling the major corporate scandals around the time of the collapse of Enron); 
Lawrence A. Cunningham, The Sarbanes-Oxley Yawn: Heavy Rhetoric, Light Reform (and 
It Just Might Work), 35 CONN. L. REV. 915, 922-27 (2003) (discussing the genesis of the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act); cf. Robert W. Hamilton, The Crisis in Corporate Governance: 2002 
Style, 40 HOUS. L. REV. 1, 5 (2003) 
reactionary manner when implementing the Sarbanes-Oxley Act).  See generally Brian Kim, 
Recent Developments
overview of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act). 
 55. Elisabeth Bumiller, Bush Signs Bill Aimed at 
July 31, 2002, at A1. 
 56. See SEC Final Rule, Executive Compensation and Related Person Disclosure, 17 
C.F.R. §§ 228-29, 232, 239-40, 245, 249, 274 (2006). 
 57. See Charles Forelle & James Bandler, The Perfect Payday, WALL ST. J., May 18, 
2006, at A1 (“The analysis [here] bolsters recent academic work su
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packages for executives.58  Such rulemaking and legislation would have 
been unlikely had the investors directly affected by the scandals not 
consisted of a large number of middle-class households and unsophisticated 
individual investors with faltering confidence in the marketplace.59  In 
2006, publicly traded U.S. companies accounted for over $12 trillion in 
market capitalization; therefore, even “a small loss in investor confidence 
can translate to a very large loss in social welfare.”60 
Additionally, the growing investor base and its growing demand for 
more timely information have also spawned various sources for business 
information.61  As a result, there has been a proliferation of business 
information sources from television to websites to blogs to satellite radio—
all dedicated to satisfying the growing demand for more information.62  
Unfortunately, not all of these alternative sources are as reliable for the less 
sophisticated, growing investor base as regulated disclosure.63 
B. The Rise of the Executive 
More disclosure about public company executives is desirable in part 
because the role—perceived or actual—of the executives, and particularly 
 
was widespread, particularly from the start of the tech-stock boom in the 1990s through the 
es, and Inferior 
ll help boost investor confidence); Cunningham, supra 
rs, supra note 29 (“‘Ongoing developments in 
CEO 97 (2005) (“New 
e spread of rumors), 
d of information sources). 
Sarbanes-Oxley corporate reform act of 2002.  If so, it was another way some executives 
enriched themselves during the boom at shareholders’ expense.”). 
 58. See SEC, Changes to Executive Compensation Disclosure, supra note 39 (“By 
taking up these critical issues and addressing them in record time, the Commission has once 
again shown its responsiveness to the continually evolving needs of American investors.”); 
Raghuram G. Rajan & Julie Wulf, Are Perks Purely Managerial Excess?, 79 J. FIN. ECON. 1 
(2006) (arguing against the perception of corporate perks as purely managerial excess); 
David Yermack, Flights of Fancy: Corporate Jets, CEO Perquisit
Shareholder Returns, 80 J. FIN. ECON. 211 (2006) (studying the association between CEO 
perquisites, focusing on use of corporate planes, and shareholder returns). 
 59. See Cook, supra note 45, at 391 n.235 and accompanying text (arguing that 
additional disclosure requirements wi
note 54, at 922-27 (postulating that public pressure on elected officials led to the swift 
passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act). 
 60. Howard H. Chang & David S. Evans, Has the Pendulum Swung Too Far?, 
REGULATION, Winter 2007/2008, at 48, 51. 
 61. See SEC, Disclosure to Investo
technology have increased both the markets’ and investors’ demand for more timely 
company disclosure on the Web . . . .’”). 
 62. See GIDEON HAIGH, FAT CATS:  THE STRANGE CULT OF THE 
business media, like CNNfn, CNBC, and Bloomberg Television, seemed to be willing the 
market higher on behalf of the eager new investment generation.”). 
 63. Compare Clifford & Anderson, supra note 38 (discussing th
with infra Part II.C (discussing the benefits of regulated disclosure as a source of reliable 
information in an environment with a myria
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the chief executive officer has transformed in the 21st century economy.64  
Many executives, namely CEOs, have become celebrities and acquired cult 
status.  Investing in securities, in some ways like sports, has become 
quotidian activity for the masses.  Like athletes, 65 CEOs are lionized or 
denigrated for their successes and failures, often getting too much credit for 
successes and too much blame for failures.66  Compounding this perception 
(or misperception), business news reporting has on some level become 
more superficial and personality driven.  Fifty years ago, the average 
American might have been hard-pressed to name the CEO of General 
Electric or General Mills.  Today, many average Americans know of Steve 
Jobs,67 Howard Schultz,68 Martha Stewart,69 Warren Buffett,70 and Bill 
Gates.71  For better or for worse, CEOs have become a greater factor in the 
investment calculus of a growing investor base.  During the 1990s, a 
“survey found that 95 percent of respondents were influenced in stock 
 
 64. See HAIGH, supra note 62, at 95-98 (discussing the changed role and perception of 
CEOs towards the end of the 21st century). 
 65. Id. at 8 (analogizing modern executives to sports stars). 
 66. See Narayana N. R. Murthy, Chairman, Infosys Technologies Ltd., Robert P. 
Maxon Lecture at George Washington University:  Good Corporate Governance—A 
Check gton 
Unive at 
http:/
 do no wrong in the eyes of their admiration-
tain public company 
acknowledging companies’ difficulties in finding independent 
tha Stewart Living Omnimedia Inc.). 
ES & PAUL ANDREWS, GATES:  HOW MICROSOFT'S 
OGUL 
list or a Mindset? 3 (Feb. 6, 2006) (transcript available on the George Washin
rsity School of Business website 
/www.business.gwu.edu/global/MaxonLecture020606.pdf): 
The decade of 1990s [sic] was the era of the stock-option-fattened, superman-
superwoman CEOs who could
heavy boards, and who were seen as demigods.  Lax oversight by boards made 
these CEOs more or less omnipotent, and corporate allies were required to 
primarily serve their interests. 
See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER BYRON, TESTOSTERONE INC.:  TALES OF CEOS GONE WILD ix-xiv 
(John Wiley & Sons, Inc. 2004) (discussing the bad behavior of cer
CEOs); Julie Creswell, Pressing for Independent Advice From Consultants, N.Y. TIMES, 
Apr. 8, 2007, at C9 (
executive compensation advice because the industry is so incestuous). 
 67. See generally YOUNG & SIMON, supra note 2 (documenting the life of Steve Jobs, 
the CEO of Apple Inc.). 
 68. See generally HOWARD SCHULTZ & DORI JONES YANG, POUR YOUR HEART INTO IT: 
HOW STARBUCKS BUILT A COMPANY ONE CUP AT A TIME (Hyperion, 1997) (chronicling the 
creation of Starbucks by its founder and CEO, Howard Schultz). 
 69. See generally CHRISTOPHER M. BYRON, MARTHA INC.:  THE INCREDIBLE STORY OF 
MARTHA STEWART LIVING OMNIMEDIA (2002) (discussing the story of Martha Stewart, the 
CEO of Mar
 70. See generally ROGER LOWENSTEIN, BUFFETT:  THE MAKING OF AN AMERICAN 
CAPITALIST (1995) (chronicling the life of Warrant Buffett, CEO and founder of Berkshire 
Hathaway). 
 71. See generally STEPHEN MAN
M REINVENTED AN INDUSTRY—AND MADE HIMSELF THE RICHEST MAN IN AMERICA 
(1993) (discussing the story of Bill Gates, co-founder and former CEO of Microsoft). 
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s.  Instead, they are viewed as oracles, titans, 
and a
 
 
selection by the CEO’s profile and reputation.”72  It would be hard for one 
to imagine Martha Stewart Living Omnimedia without Martha Stewart,73 
Apple without Steve Jobs,74 Starbucks without Howard Schultz, or 
Berkshire Hathaway without Warren Buffett.  Consequentially, it would be 
hard—rightly or wrongly—for one to imagine the continued success of 
these companies without their founders or CEOs.  Many charismatic 
executives, particularly CEOs, are no longer considered temporary 
stewards of great enterprise
lchemists, without whom their companies (and their companies’ stock 
valuations) would perish.75 
As a result of the new heft of CEOs’ crowns in the modern economy, 
their compensation has also increased.76  “CEO compensation surged 535 
percent in the 1990s” alone.77  While the CEO role has become more 
important to a growing number of investors, and while CEOs themselves 
have been handsomely compensated for their new influence,78 yet the SEC 
 72. HAIGH, supra note 62, at 98. 
 73. See Cynthia A. Caillavet, From Nike v. Kasky to Martha Stewart:  First Amendment 
pare 
 note 7 (describing the indispensability of Steve Jobs to Apple), with Letter 
from s of 
Berks
/2007
is a huge asset for any enterprise, and at Berkshire we 
ay enjoy outsized and growing earnings, but that tells little about its 
f stock options as a 
ulf, supra note 58 (finding it incorrect to treat 
a
pany planes). 
Protection for Corporate Speakers' Denials of Public Criminal Allegations, 94 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 1033, 1039 n.36 (2004) (noting the vital role of Martha Stewart’s personage 
to her company). 
 74. See Nocera, supra note 7 (discussing the affect of the rumors in 2008 about Steve 
Jobs’s health and the lack of disclosure and statements from Apple on the market’s ability to 
properly value the company’s shares and evaluate future prospects of the company). 
 75. See Murthy, supra note 66 (discussing good corporate governance).  Com
Nocera, supra
Warrant E. Buffet, Chairman, Berkshire Hathaway, Inc., to the Shareholder
hire Hathaway, Inc. (February 2008), http://www.berkshirehathaway.com/letters 
ltr.pdf: 
Of course, a terrific CEO 
have an abundance of these managers.  Their abilities have created billions of 
dollars of value that would never have materialized if typical CEOs had been 
running their businesses. 
But if a business requires a superstar to produce great results, the business itself 
cannot be deemed great.  A medical partnership led by your area’s premier brain 
surgeon m
future.  The partnership’s moat will go when the surgeon goes.  You can count, 
though, on the moat of the Mayo Clinic to endure, even though you can’t name 
its CEO. 
 76. See HAIGH, supra note 62, at 11 (discussing astronomical growth in executive 
compensation during the 1990s partially as a result of the increased use o
form of compensation); Rajan & W
m nagerial perks solely as excess compensation); Yermack, supra note 58 (discussing 
perquisites of CEOs, specifically their personal use of com
 77. HAIGH, supra note 62, at 11. 
 78. See Yermack, supra note 58 (discussing the largess of executive compensation 
packages and perks despite inferior shareholder returns). 
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ces under current 
rules must be redesigned for the new reality to provide for more 
 suites.80 
C.  
s by companies 
so th
 
 
has not meaningfully updated the regulations to reflect the new reality by 
calling for more material disclosure from these executives.79  Such 
heightened status from the investing public should also come with 
heightened accountability to the investing public, and sensible additional 
disclosure from public company executives would be a responsible step in 
that direction.  Therefore, current rules or existing practi
transparency and accountability in the executive
Regulated Disclosure:  Efficient and Fair 
If more disclosure about executives is desirable and needed, regulated 
principle-based disclosure under the current framework is arguably most 
efficient and fair, despite the proliferation of alternative information 
sources.81  Regulated disclosure would allow the most accurate information 
(due to fear of liability) to be disseminated simultaneously to the largest 
number of people and create uniformity of process.82  In 2000, the SEC 
promulgated Regulation Fair Disclosure (“Reg FD”).  Reg FD was 
promulgated to address the problem of selective disclosure
at material information becomes available to the public simultaneously 
or promptly after it has been disclosed to selected parties.83 
Some would argue that additional disclosure is not required because 
modern media will shed more light and scrutiny on public company 
executives.84  The proliferation of blogs, perpetual news cycles, business 
 79. See Nocera, supra note 7, at C1 (“There are no hard and fast rules about how and 
rmation 
rally John Schwartz, Transparency, Lost in the Fog, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 8, 
REV. 717, 733-34 (1984) (advocating for mandatory disclosure 
s 
isclosure duties reduce the cost of 
a
 7, at C1 (providing examples of varying disclosure practices 
hen Merrill Lynch 
when companies need to disclose information about the health of their chief executives. . . .  
No company has ever been held to account by the S.E.C. for failing to disclose info
about its chief executive’s health . . . .”). 
 80. See gene
2007, at C1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/04/08/business/yourmoney 
/08fog.html (discussing the lack of understandable disclosure regarding executive 
compensation). 
 81. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Market Failure and the Economic Case for a Mandatory 
Disclosure System, 70 VA. L. 
a a means of minimizing wasteful resource spending in data gathering); Goshen & 
Parchomovsky, supra note 14, at 738 (“Mandatory d
se rching for information.”). 
 82. See Nocera, supra note
by companies regarding the health of their executives). 
 83. See Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 65 Fed. Reg. 51,716 (Aug. 24, 2000) 
(adopting the new SEC rules). 
 84. For example, Dealbook, http://dealbook.blogs.nytimes.com/, and Dealbreaker, 
http://dealbreaker.com, cover rumors in the marketplace and the comings and goings of 
CEOs.  In 2007, Dealbreaker released the golfing habits and scores of t
CEO, Stanley O’Neal.  Posting of Bess Levin to Dealbreaker, 
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news channels, corporate websites, and chat rooms has undoubtedly created 
more scrutiny for public company executives.85  However, absent regulated 
disclosure, information of varying quality86 and relevance87 will be 
disseminated sporadically and selectively, thereby creating information 
uncertainty in the marketplace that will result in pricing inefficiencies.88  
Principle-based regulated disclosure of information about executives, like 
other information required under the current federal framework, allows all 
investors to receive a reasonable modicum of high-quality information at 
the same time without regard for connections, wealth, size, or buying 
power; and it creates a uniform process for disclosing such private matters 
consistent with the SEC’s promulgation of Reg FD.89  Because each 
 
http://dealbreaker.com/2007/10/stan_oneal_has_got_his_priorit.php (Oct. 26, 2007, 14:37 
g on Wall 
TIMES, July 8, 2008, 
os., the Federal Reserve last 
007/07/when_executives_hit_the_links.php (July 9, 2007, 14:47 
08, 12:05 EST) (“Shares of United Airlines plunged 
o
EST) (displaying the dates and scores of Stanley O’Neal’s golf outings). 
 85. See, e.g., Clifford & Anderson, supra note 38 (examining rumor-spreadin
Street); Andrew Ross Sorkin, Psst! Hear the Rumor of the Day?, N.Y. 
at C1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/07/08/business/08sorkin.html? 
_r=1&ref=business&oref=slogin (discussing the spreading of rumors). 
 86. In the absence of regulated disclosure, rumors and less reputable information can 
carry greater weight and lack a meaningful counter-weight, such as disclosure through the 
SEC to refute them, thereby resulting in serious adverse effects on the marketplace.  
Moreover, principle-based disclosure regulations can serve as a powerful signaling 
mechanism for the market in instances where a company lacks disclosure about certain 
adverse events or risks.  For example, assuming that the SEC articulated the principle that 
companies must disclose when CEOs are diagnosed with cancer, the absence of such 
disclosure by companies should comfort investors that are concerned about a cancer-
stricken CEO.  See Clifford & Anderson, supra note 38, at  C1, C3 (“Rumors [which] have 
long been a part of Wall Street’s fabric, and to prove rumor-mongering is a difficult task, 
especially with 24-hour news and communications technology like instant messaging and 
text messaging. . . .  Since Wall Street firms are highly leveraged businesses that need 
outside financing, confidence is crucial, and rumors can overshadow the strength of their 
businesses, executives say.”); Matthew Karnitschnig & Susanne Craig, Fed Acted on 
Lehman Rumor, WALL ST. J., Aug. 21, 2008, at C1 (“In an apparent attempt to prevent a 
repeat of the cascading rumors that helped sink Bear Stearns C
month quietly called one major bank to see if it had pulled a credit line from Lehman 
Brothers Holdings Inc., people familiar with the matter said.”). 
 87. The advent and proliferation of business weblogs have led to coverage for both 
meaningful as well as trivial matters concerning executives.  For example, in 2008, the 
weblog, Dealbreaker.com, reported the golf handicap of some of Wall Street’s top CEOs.  
See When Executives Hit the Links: Does Golf Affect Stock Prices?, 
http://dealbreaker.com/2
EST) (discussing the possible relationship between a CEO’s golf score and the company’s 
change in stock price). 
 88. See False Report Sends UAL Shares Plunging, Posting of Micheline Maynard to 
Dealbook, N.Y. TIMES, http://dealbook.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/09/08/false-report-sends-
ual-shares-plunging/ (Sept. 8, 20
M nday morning when a false rumor swept financial markets that the struggling carrier had 
filed for bankruptcy protection.”). 
 89. See Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, supra note 83 (adopting new rules 
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comp
nning, when appropriate.  
Finally, another benefit of regulated disclosure is that it may de-stigmatize 
ons 
continue to thrive in their roles post-disclosure.92 
ure in the realm of two hypothetical 
CEOs to highlight the practical implications and difficulties surrounding 
the e  two characters are fictitious but based on 
composites of real world executives. 
 
any and each executive is unique, principle-based regulated disclosure 
provides flexibility to the companies to decide what disclosure is 
appropriate.90 
Aside from fairness and efficiency, there are collateral benefits of 
regulated disclosure.  One benefit is that it can result in more efficient use 
of resources in the greater marketplace by reducing information-gathering 
costs, which some argue creates no additional value to the marketplace.91  
Another benefit of regulated disclosure is that as companies become more 
aware of certain material, such as private matters concerning their 
executives, they may improve their succession pla
certain human conditions to the extent that executives with these conditi
D.   The Senile Sage & The Mad Queen 
While the foregoing arguments advocating more disclosure 
concerning public company executives may be persuasive, it is instructive 
to examine the issue of such disclos
issu .  The following
1.  The Senile Sage 
Winston B. Welchers (a.k.a. Mr. W) is the chief investment officer, 
chief executive officer, and chairman of Orange Inc., a holding company 
that owns subsidiaries that engage in a wide range of diverse businesses, 
from furniture stores to oil storage to gold mining.  Orange Inc. also owns 
over one hundred insurance and reinsurance entities.  Corporate returns and 
 
that address the issue of selective disclosure of material, non-public information). 
 90. See infra Part IV.C (discussing the meaning of “material” for federal securities 
laws). 
 91. See Coffee, supra note 81, at 733–34 (1984) (postulating that trading gains do not 
create additional real wealth, while information gathering “consumes real resources.”); 
Sanford J. Grossman & Joseph E. Stiglitz, On the Impossibility of Informationally Efficient 
Markets, 70 AM. ECON. REV. 393-400 (1980) (proposing a model “in which there is an 
 
nior executives. 
equilibrium degree of disequilibrium:  prices reflect the information of informed individuals 
(arbitrageurs) but only partially, so that those who expend resources to obtain information 
do receive compensation”). 
 92. For example, a CEO who is battling cancer, yet continues to thrive in her position, 
post-diagnosis and post-disclosure, may remove some of the stigma associated with cancer
survivors serving and succeeding as se
  
398 U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW [Vol. 11:2 
 
. W has no intention of retiring 
until
ty about the company’s future 
leadership.  Within two weeks, five class action lawsuits were filed and the 
SEC  tice, and the State Attorneys General from five 
states all commenced formal investigations. 
 
equities returns on Orange Inc. have bested the S&P 500 Index93 in 
eighteen of the past twenty years.  Mr. W is lauded as an oracle and 
innovator for his equity investments and his ability to cut costs and create 
organic growth in his subsidiaries.  Stock analysts often speak of the “W 
premium” placed on Orange Inc.’s stock simply because of Mr. W’s 
presence at the helm.94  Mr. W is seventy-seven years old and many expect 
him to step aside very soon.  However, Mr
 he is incapable of doing his job.  Because of Mr. W’s past and 
continued success, no clear succession plan has been implemented, and he 
is under little pressure to implement one.95 
Recently, blogs and chat rooms became abuzz with rumors that Mr. W 
was diagnosed with early symptoms of Alzheimer’s disease last year.  The 
rumors persisted for several days, causing Orange Inc.’s stock to drop 
precipitously.  After eight days of rumor, innuendo, and speculation, the 
Wall Street Journal reported that the company confirmed that Mr. W was 
indeed suffering from early dementia and would step down immediately.  
The story also indicated that board of directors and senior management of 
the management had only confirmed Mr. W’s illness in the past two days.  
Upon the break of the story, Orange Inc. lost 25% of its market 
capitalization as investors fled over uncertain
, the Department of Jus
2.  The Mad Queen 
Mary Gigs McQueen (a.k.a. Mrs. Q) is the founder, chief technology 
officer, and chief executive officer of MQ Enterprises Inc., an integrated 
media, technology, and merchandising company.  MQ Enterprises produces 
magazines, television shows, household items, and consumer electronics 
under the “Q” brand.  Last year, the company had over ten billion dollars in 
total revenue.  Mrs. Q is lauded as a lifestyle and technology visionary with 
 
 93. See Standard & Poor’s 500-stock Index (S&P 500), MORGAN STANLEY,  
morganstanleyindividual.com/customerservice/dictionary/default.asp?letter=S#Ihttp://www.
DAT4GPD (as of January 31, 2009). 
 94. It is widely believed in the investing world that certain CEOs, by their mere 
reputation, add value or a premium to their company’s stock price.  See, e.g., EMILY ROSS & 
ANGUS HOLLAND, 100 GREAT BUSINESSES AND THE MINDS BEHIND THEM 271 (Sourcebooks, 
Inc. 2006) (2004) (“Berkshire Hathaway has a significant Buffett premium built into [its] 
price.”). 
 95. See Geraldine Fabrikant, A Maestro of Investments in the Style of Buffett, N.Y. 
TIMES, Apr. 23, 2007, at C1 (discussing the difficulties in replacing an executive who acts 
both as chief executive officer and chief investment officer). 
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 her husband without giving him proper credit.97  As part 
of the divorce settlement, Mr. Q is demanding half of Mrs. Q’s majority 
stake
died shortly thereafter.100  In 2007, the career of John Browne, the CEO 
 
a Midas touch.  Her face graces the cover of every issue of her three 
magazine publications and she hosts two television shows.  Additionally, 
the “Q” digital entertainment player was lauded as a revolutionary product 
that created a two billion dollar portable digital entertainment market. 
Recently, MQ Enterprises saw its stock plummet forty percent based 
on some news about Mrs. Q.  According to news reports, last year Mrs. Q’s 
husband, Mr. Q, filed for divorce and requested sole custody of their two 
young sons.  In sealed court papers concerning the divorce and custody 
proceedings that recently leaked online, it is alleged, inter alia, that Mrs. Q 
used cocaine, was questioned by the U.S. Attorney as part of an insider 
trading investigation, and has been diagnosed with ovarian cancer.96  
Additionally, court documents reveal that Mrs. Q has substantial holdings 
through intricate partnerships in some of MQ Enterprises’ chief 
competitors and has allegedly used business ideas, including those for 
critical patents, of
 in MQ Enterprises, which could change control of the company.98  
None of the foregoing was previously known to the company’s board of 
directors or senior management.  The New York State Attorney General 
has launched an investigation into any potential wrongdoing by Mrs. Q and 
MQ Enterprises. 
 
While the foregoing scenarios about Mr. W and Mrs. Q may seem 
implausible, the individual circumstances of each scenario are not only 
plausible, but likely exist or have occurred in the business world.  In 2003, 
the ubiquitous Martha Stewart, the then-CEO of Martha Stewart Living 
Omnimedia, Inc., was charged for making materially false statements of 
fact regarding her sale of ImClone securities to sustain the market value of 
her company.99  In 2004, Charles Bell, the newly elected CEO of 
McDonald’s Corporation, resigned after being diagnosed with cancer and 
 
 96. See generally W. Bruce Johnson, Robert P. Magee, Nandu J. Nagarajan & Harry A. 
Newman, An Analysis of the Stock Price Reaction to Sudden Executive Deaths:  
Implications for the Managerial Labor Market, 7 J. ACCT. & ECON. 151 (1985) (studying the 
association between unexpected deaths of senior corporate executives and the common 
sing the impact of securities 
EO 
mpany). 
17, 2005), 
05/cpr_01162005.html. 
stock price of their respective corporations). 
 97. See generally Liu & Yermack, supra note 23 (discus
transactions by CEOs on the performance of their companies). 
 98. See, e.g., Yung, supra note 21, at 2D (highlighting the advantages of a C
disclosing personal reasons, such as a divorce settlement, to sell stock in his co
 99. United States v. Stewart, 305 F. Supp. 2d 368, 370 (S.D.N.Y. 2004). 
 100. Press Release, McDonald’s Corporation, McDonald’s Former President and CEO 
Charlie Bell Dies of Cancer (Jan. 
http://mcdonaldsemail.com/corp/news/corppr/20
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 court allowed a 
United Kingdom newspaper group to publish a set of articles about the 
tical and 
the r th illustrate that the current rules or traditionally-
accepted practices under the current rules could be enhanced by requiring 
addit
narrative disclosures through Regulation S-K.108  Whereas the Securities 
Act governs the issuance of securities, the Exchange Act governs the 
 
who turned British Petroleum PLC into one of the world's most valuable oil 
companies, came to an unceremonious end after a British
executive's long relationship with a young man.101  The hypothe
eal world cases bo
ional disclosures from public company executives.102 
III.  THE GENERAL DISCLOSURE OBLIGATIONS OF THE FEDERAL 
SECURITIES LAWS 
Congress built the SEC on the excesses of the Roaring Twenties and 
on the ruins of the Great Depression by enacting two pieces of landmark 
legislation:  the Securities Act of 1933103 (the “Securities Act”) and the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934104 (the “Exchange Act”).  The chief 
purpose of the Securities Act is “to provide full and fair disclosure of the 
character of securities sold in interstate and foreign commerce and through 
the mails, and to prevent frauds in the sale thereof, and for other 
purposes.”105  The Securities Act requires the registration of any offer and 
sale of securities using the “means or instruments of transportation or 
communication in interstate commerce.”106  The Securities Act, through the 
registration process, attempts to ensure that investors receive truthful, 
accurate, and material information about the issuer and the securities being 
offered by mandating certain line item disclosures107 and more meaningful 
 
 101. MacDonald et al., supra note 22 at A1. 
 102. It is worth noting that, had there been stronger executive disclosure requirements in 
place at the respective times of our hypothetical and real-world cases, the impact of those 
events may not have been softer or different save for a temporal difference.  Mrs. Stewart’s 
company’s stock would have dropped upon the news of her charges regardless of whether 
ould result in better corporate governance, which is in part about being 
0) (originally enacted as Act of May 27, 1933, ch. 38, § 1, 
 U.S.C. §§ 78a-mm (2000) (originally enacted as Act of June 6, 1934, ch. 404, § 
the news came from company disclosures or from media outlets.  Nonetheless, regulated 
disclosure w
forthright on a timely basis with shareholders and with the marketplace regardless of the 
consequences. 
 103. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-aa (200
48 Stat. 74). 
 104. 15
1, 48 Stat. 881). 
 105. 15 U.S.C. § 77a (2000). 
 106. 15 U.S.C. § 77e (2000) (originally enacted as Act of May 27, 1933, ch. 38, § 1, 48 
Stat. 74). 
 107. 15 U.S.C. § 77aa (2000). 
 108. 17 C.F.R. § 229 (2008). 
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W and 
Mrs. Q, are not likely to be disclosed under traditional disclosure practice 
n or issued guidance 
concerning the disclosure of private facts, such as serious illness.113 
terial matters, such as serious illness118 or significant 
changes in personal financial situation.119  Moreover, decades of disclosure 
 
subsequent trading and sales of those securities.109  The Exchange Act, 
through its broad anti-fraud provision110 and its periodic reporting 
requirements,111 attempts to ensure that investors in the secondary market 
for securities receive truthful, accurate, and material information about the 
issuer and the securities being offered.  While the Securities Act and the 
Exchange Act both require some disclosure about management executives 
and other significant employees,112 certain types of private, material 
information, such as those involving our hypothetical CEOs Mr. 
because the SEC has never taken enforcement actio
A.   Disclosure and Fraud Under the Securities Act 
The Securities Act requires that most public offerings of securities in 
the United States undergo a registration process with the SEC.114  As part 
of the process, the issuer publicly files a registration statement with the 
SEC.115  The registration statement and the accompanying prospectus must 
include certain disclosures outlined in the registration form itself and in 
Regulation S-K.116  In terms of disclosure about company executives and 
other significant employees, the SEC requires a brief summary of their 
experiences and backgrounds as well as of related party transactions and 
legal proceedings.117  Nonetheless, there are no explicit requirements to 
disclose private, ma
 
 109. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-mm (2000) (originally enacted as Act of June 6, 1934, ch. 404, § 
1, 48 Stat. 881). 
 110. See supra Part III.B (discussing Rule 10b-5 under the Exchange Act). 
 111. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 13(a)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 78m(a)(1) (requiring 
re of a company’s directors, 
, supra note 6 (“The SEC requires that any public company disclose 
so that they can include it in their calculation of whether to 
u  specific guidelines governing health issues, and the 
formation required for registration). 
g the disclosure by a CEO that he 
public companies to “keep reasonably current the information and documents required to be 
included in or filed with an application or registration statement” required by Section 12 of 
the Exchange Act). 
 112. 17 C.F.R. § 229.401 (2008) (requiring the disclosu
officers, and certain key employees). 
 113. See Elkind
material information to investors 
b y or sell a stock.  But there are no
SEC has never taken action against a company in this area.”). 
 114. See 15 U.S.C. § 77g (2000) (outlining the in
 115. Id. 
 116. 17 C.F.R. § 229 (2008). 
 117. 17 C.F.R. § 229.401 (2008). 
 118. See Glenn, supra note 25, at 541-42 (noting the absence of clearly settled federal 
law mandating the disclosure of executive illness). 
 119. See, e.g., Yung, supra note 21, at 2D (describin
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pract
iance on the materially false statement or omission, and the 
defen
an affirmative 
defen
ns all securities transactions—public and private—and serves as a 
 
 
ice traditionally have not resulted in the disclosure of such private, 
material matters. 120 
In addition to the explicit disclosure requirements, disclosure resulting 
from the Securities Act also arises because of its antifraud provisions under 
Sections 11, 12, and 17.  Section 11 of the Securities Act creates liability 
for registration statements that “contain an untrue statement of a material 
fact or omit to state a material fact required to be stated therein or 
necessary to make the statements therein not misleading.”121  A finding of 
liability is likely for the issuing company in the event that there are 
materially false statements or omissions in the registration statement 
because the issuing company is strictly liable for such false statements or 
omissions.122  Under Section 11, a plaintiff does not have the burden of 
proving rel
se cannot use the absence of such reliance as an affirmative 
defense.123 
Section 12 of the Securities Act broadens the scope of liability to 
cover communications made outside the registration statement in 
connection with a securities offering.124  Section 12 makes liable any 
person who offers or sells a security “by means of a prospectus or oral 
communication, which includes an untrue statement of a material fact or 
omits to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements, in 
the light of the circumstances under which they were made, not 
misleading[.]”125  Unlike Section 11, Section 12 offers 
se for parties that “did not know, and in the exercise of reasonable 
care could not have known, of such untruth or omission.”126 
Section 17 of the Securities Act is the general antifraud provision that 
gover
sold s
 120 lose 
mater er to 
buy or sell a stock. But there are no specific guidelines governing health issues, and the SEC 
pany in this area.”). 
eed only show a material misstatement or omission to establish their 
S.C. § 77(l) (2008) (covering liabilities arising from prospectuses and 
o ions). 
tock in his company to pay a divorce settlement). 
. Cf. Elkind, supra note 6 (“The SEC requires that any public company disc
ial information to investors so that they can include it in their calculation of wheth
has never taken action against a com
 121. 15 U.S.C. § 77(k) (2008). 
 122. See, e.g., Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 382 (1983) (Liability 
against the issuer of a security is virtually absolute. . . .”); Degulis v. LXR Biotechnology, 
Inc., 928 F. Supp. 1301, 1314 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (“Sections 11 and 12(2) provide for strict 
liability. . . .”); In re Worlds of Wonder Sec. Litig., 694 F. Supp. 1427, 1434 (N.D. Cal. 
1988) (“[P]laintiffs n
prima facie case.”). 
 123. 15 U.S.C. § 77(k) (1998). 
 124. See 15 U.
c mmunicat
 125. Id. 
 126. Id. 
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shiel tes 
that: 
f any 
oney or property by means of any untrue statement 
atory cousin, Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act,129 which 
was based in part on Section 17.130  As a result, many plaintiffs join their 
However, it should be 
noted that there are meaningful differences between Section 10(b) and 
Secti
B.   Disclosure and Fraud Under the Exchange Act 
es, inter alia, that “[c]ompanies with more 
 
d for purchasers and a sword against sellers.127  Section 17(q) sta
It shall be unlawful for any person in the offer or sale o
securities or any security-based swap agreement (as defined in 
section 206B of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act [15 USCS § 
78(c)]) by the use of any means or instruments of transportation 
or communication in interstate commerce or by use of the mails, 
directly or indirectly— 
(1) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, or 
(2) to obtain m
of a material fact or any omission to state a material fact 
necessary in order to make the statements made, in light of the 
circumstances under which they were made, not misleading; or 
(3) to engage in any transaction, practice, or course of business 
which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon the 
purchaser.128 
The elements of proof under Section 17 are similar to those of its more 
prominent regul
Section 17(a) actions with Section 10(b) actions.131  
on 17(a).  Namely, scienter is necessary in actions under Section 10(b) 
and Section 17(a)(1),132 but not required in actions under Sections 17(a)(2) 
and 17(a)(3).133 
The Exchange Act requir
 
 127. 15 U.S.C. § 77(q) (2008). 
 128. 15 U.S.C. § 77(q)(a) (2008). 
Cir. 1982) (“Perhaps 
13 F. Supp. 571, 578 (N.D. Ill. 1981) (“[P]laintiffs 
felder, 425 U.S. 185, 193 (1976) (holding that scienter is 
) and 17(a)(3) actions). 
 129. 15 U.S.C. § 78(j) (2008); see infra Part III.B. 
 130. See Harry S. Gerla, Issuers Raising Capital Directly From Investors:  What 
Disclosure Does Rule 10b-5 Require?, 28 J. CORP. L. 111, 115 (2002) (“Rule 10b-5 was 
copied from section 17.”). 
 131. See Landry v. All Am. Assurance Co., 688 F.2d 381, 386 (5th 
the main reason for the somewhat awkward development of the law under § 17(a) of the 
1933 Act is the fact that it has traditionally lived in the shadow of another area of securities 
law: Rule 10b-5.”); Spatz v. Borenstein, 5
have often ‘boot-strapped’ § 17(a) allegations to their 10b-5 claims.”). 
 132. See Ernst & Ernst v. Hoch
required for 10(b) actions); Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680, 701-02 (1980) (holding that 
scienter is required for 17(a)(1) actions). 
 133. Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680, 701-02 (1980) (holding that scienter is not necessary 
for 17(a)(2
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  Required reports, such as 
10-K
 documents.136 
nge 
Act der 
Rule
It sh by the 
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ey were made, not misleading, or 
 which 
u on any 
of material fact in connection with the purchase or sale of a security which 
caused the plaintiff economic loss after the plaintiff justifiably relied on 
 
than $10 million in assets whose securities are held by more than 500 
owners must file annual and other periodic reports” and make them 
available to the public.134  This requirement also extends to companies that 
are listed on the national securities exchanges.135
s, 10-Qs and 8-Ks, are often incorporated by reference into the 
registration statement and prospectus in the event of a securities offering 
and become part of the offering
In addition to the bright-line disclosure requirements, the Excha
also encourages disclosures through a broad antifraud provision un
 10b-5, which states that: 
all be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, 
f any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of 
ails or of any facility of any national securities exchange, 
To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, 
To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit 
to state a material fact necessary in order to make the 
statements made, in the light of the circumstances under 
which th
To engage in any act, practice, or course of business
operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit p
person, 
in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.137 
Generally, to prevail on a Rule 10b-5 claim, a plaintiff must prove that 
the defendant acted with scienter in making the false statement or omission 
such statements and omissions.138  Since its promulgation in 1942, the 
 
 134. SEC, The Laws That Govern the Securities Industry, 
to file reports with the SEC and the 
x f 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 781(b) (1994) (outlining the 
nter.”); San Leandro Emergency Medical Group Profit 
http://sec.gov/about/laws.shtml (last visited Nov. 25, 2008); see also 17 C.F.R. § 240.12g-1 
(2001) (exempting issuer from registration requirements if total assets do not exceed $10 
million). 
 135. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78m(a) (1994) (requiring 
companies registered on a national securities exchange 
e change); Securities Exchange Act o
requirements to register a security on a national securities exchange). 
 136. See 15 U.S.C. § 78m(a) (1994) (requiring the filing of annual reports and other 
information as prescribed by the SEC rules and regulations); 17 C.F.R. § 240.13a-1 
(outlining the periodic disclosure requirements of Exchange Act registered companies); 17 
C.F.R. § 249.310 (Exchange Act Form 10-K),17 C.F.R. § 249.308a (Exchange Act Form 
10-Q); 17 C.F.R. § 249.308 (Exchange Act Form 8-K). 
 137. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1998). 
 138. See, e.g., Dura Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 341 (2005) (“[T]he action’s 
basic elements include . . . scie
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scope of the rule has been greatly expanded by the lower courts.139  Many 
securities law practitioners and scholars consider it to be the most 
important liability rule—a supernova in the securities laws universe.140 
C.   What is “Material”? 
Looming prominently in the disclosure and antifraud provisions of the 
federal securities laws is the specter of materiality.  What is “material”?  In 
TSC Industries, Inc. v. Northway, Inc., the leading case on the subject, the 
Supreme Court held that: 
An omitted fact is material if there is a substantial likelihood that 
a reasonable shareholder would consider it important in deciding 
how to vote . . . . Put another way, there must be a substantial 
likelihood that the disclosure of the omitted fact would have been 
viewed by the reasonable investor as having significantly altered 
the “total mix” of information made available.141 
This definition was later broadly adopted for securities law purposes 
in Basic, Inc. v. Levinson.142  Because of the “total mix” concept in the 
definition of materiality, each misstatement and omission is generally 
considered on an individual basis in light of the specific facts and 
circumstances surrounding it.  Questions of materiality usually require 
juries to make “delicate assessments of the inferences a ‘reasonable 
investor’ would draw from a given set of facts and the significance of those 
inferences to him.”143  Nonetheless, case law in this area has created some 
 
Sharing Plan v. Philip Morris Companies, Inc., 75 F.3d 801, 808 (2d Cir. 1996) (“[A] 
plaintiff must plead that the defendant made a false statement or omitted a material fact, 
with scienter, and that plaintiff’s reliance on defendant’s action caused plaintiff injury.”); 
Bruschi v. Brown, 876 F.2d 1526, 1528 (11th Cir. 1989) (“The elements of a Rule 10b-5 
cause of action are:  (1) the defendant made a false statement or omission of material fact, 
wise and 
 REV. 359, 367-
y, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 448 (1976). 
:  
(2) with scienter, (3) upon which the plaintiff justifiably relied, and  (4) that proximately 
caused the plaintiff's damages.”). 
 139. See, e.g., SEC v. Zandford, 535 U.S. 813, 818-35 (2002) (alluding to the expansion 
of the rule and its jurisprudence). 
 140. See, e.g., William K.S. Wang, Trading on Material Nonpublic Information on 
Impersonal Stock Markets:  Who Is Harmed, and Who Can Sue Whom Under SEC Rule 
10b-5?, 54 S. CAL. L. REV. 1217, 1217-71 (1981) (highlighting the growing number of 
actions under Rule 10b-5); Julie A. Herzog, Fraud Created the Market:  An Un
Unwarranted Extension of Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, 63 GEO. WASH. L.
70 (1995) (critiquing the wide reach and impact of the application of Rule 10b-5). 
 141. TSC Industries, Inc. v. Northwa
 142. 485 U.S. 224, 231-32 (1988) (adopting the previously mentioned definition of 
“material” in a securities law context). 
 143. TSC Industries, 426 U.S. at 450; see also John M. Fedders, Qualitative Materiality
The Birth, Struggles, and Demise of an Unworkable Standard, 48 CATH. U. L. REV. 41, 45-
48 (1998) (discussing the difficulties and subjectivity involved in determining materiality). 
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e that no 
reaso
aterial if the company has made available more 
comp
exist in the markets.151 
 
interpretative guidance. 
For one, some courts have held that if the alleged misstatement or 
omission is clearly insignificant, then it would be considered immaterial as 
a matter of law.144  This can be the case where the alleged misstatement or 
omission “present[s] or conceal[s] such insignificant data that, in the total 
mix of information, it simply would not matter.”145  In terms of 
significance, and materiality as a matter of law, some courts are of the view 
that actionable statements need some level of specificity and not only be 
puffery.146  “Alleged misrepresentations can be immaterial as a matter of 
law if they . . . are so vague and of such obvious hyperbol
nable investor would rely upon them.”147  Therefore, customary 
statements by company officials such as “our core metrics remain strong,” 
“we are always looking for potential acquisitions,” and “we [continue] to 
be focused on growth,” are generally considered mere puffery.148 
Additionally, some courts have held that alleged misstatements or 
omissions are not materially misleading if the market possesses the correct 
information.149  For example, if a company executive in an interview fails 
to fully describe a topic related to the company, such a misstatement or 
omission may not be m
lete and correct information on that topic as part of its periodic filings 
with the SEC.150  Similarly, an inadvertent misstatement of a widely-
known, verifiable fact may not be actionable since corrective mechanisms 
 
 144. See, e.g., Recupito v. Prudential Secs., Inc., 112 F. Supp. 2d 449, 454 (D. Md. 
2000) (“[I]f the alleged misstatements or omissions ‘are so obviously unimportant to an 
investor that reasonable minds cannot differ on the question of materiality, the court may 
on Cos., 186 F.3d 
ec. Litig., 116 F. Supp. 2d 446, 466 (S.D.N.Y. 
 that are essentially mere puffery.”); City of Monroe 
), cert. denied, 
ble information filed with the SEC served as a 
m for alleged misstatements). 
rule them immaterial as a matter of law.’” (quoting Klein v. Gen. Nutriti
338, 342 (3d Cir. 1999))); cf. Ganino v. Citizens Utils. Co., 228 F.3d 154, 162-63 (2d Cir. 
2000) (reversing a district court decision for determining immateriality as a matter of law 
based on a single data point). 
 145. Chambers v. AMDOCS Ltd., 390 F.3d 542, 548 (8th Cir. 2004). 
 146. See, e.g., In re N. Telecom Ltd. S
2000) (“[S]ingle, vague statement[s]
Employees Ret. Sys. v. Bridgestone Corp., 399 F.3d 651, 671 (6th Cir. 2005
546 U.S. 936 (2005) (holding that vague statements not subject to verification by proof are 
generally deemed non-actionable puffery). 
 147. Chambers, 390 F.3d at 548. 
 148. Rosenzweig v. Azurix Corp., 332 F.3d 854, 869-70 (5th Cir. 2003). 
 149. See, e.g., Southland Sec. Corp. v. INSpire Ins. Solutions, Inc., 365 F.3d 353, 368 
(5th Cir. 2004) (holding that publicly availa
corrective mechanis
 150. See Ieradi v. Mylan Labs., Inc., 230 F.3d 594, 599-600 (3d Cir. 2000) (holding that 
failure to disclose certain terms of significant contracts is not material when disclosure in 
the company’s 10-Q alludes to such terms). 
 151. See id. 
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ionary 
state
iality.156  This lack of objective 
clarity may be frustrating to some, but it may also be necessary because 
ined 
through the unique lens of each company. 
 
Similarly, some courts have held that alleged misstatements and 
omissions can be neutralized and negated by ample cautionary language in 
disclosure documents; this is the so-called “bespeaks caution” doctrine.152  
Regulation S-K requires that periodic filings such as the annual report on 
Form 10-K and the prospectuses contain, where appropriate, “risk factors” 
relating to the company or its offering.153  Public companies, in relying on 
the “bespeaks caution” doctrine, include ample cautionary language in their 
disclosure documents in the hope of shielding themselves from future 
liability.  While cautionary language can provide a shielding blanket for 
public companies, the language must be specific and properly constructed 
in order to be meaningful and effective.  Broad sweeping caut
ments will offer little warmth against the cold stare of hindsight in a 
civil action.  Effective and meaningful cautionary language must be 
sufficiently specific154 and directed at forward-looking statements.155 
While the body of law since TSC Industries, Inc. has offered many 
guideposts for gauging materiality, there still remains some difficulty and 
subjectivity in the determination of mater
each company is different; a determination of materiality must be exam
 
 152. See Halperin v. eBanker USA.com, Inc., 295 F.3d 352, 360-61 (2d Cir. 2002) 
(holding that “cautionary language address[ing] the relevant risk directly” negates an 
allegedly material omission); Grossman v. Novell, Inc., 120 F.3d 1112, 1120 (10th Cir. 
1997) (same); Gasner v. Board of Supervisors, 103 F.3d 351, 358 (4th Cir. 1996) (same); 
Saltzberg v. TM Sterling/Austin Assocs., 45 F.3d 399, 400 (11th Cir. 1995) (same); In re 
Worlds of Wonder Sec. Litig., 35 F.3d 1407, 1413-15 (9th Cir. 1994) (same); Rubinstein v. 
Collins, 20 F.3d 160, 166-68 (5th Cir. 1994) (arguing that cautionary language might render 
predictive statements immaterial but is not per se dispositive under the “bespeaks caution” 
doctrine); In re Donald J. Trump Casino Sec. Litig., 7 F.3d 357, 371-73 (3d Cir. 1993) 
(applying the “bespeaks caution” doctrine where cautionary language was tailored 
specifically to address uncertainty forming the basis for plaintiffs’ claim). 
 153. Regulation S-K, Item 503, 17 C.F.R. § 229.503 (2008). 
 154. See Grossman, 120 F.3d at 1120 (requiring sufficiently specific risk disclosures or 
cautionary language to nullify any potentially misleading statements); In re Westinghouse 
Sec. Litig., 90 F.3d 696, 707-08 (3d Cir. 1996) (same); Shaw v. Digital Equip. Corp., 82 
F.3d 1194, 1213-14 (1st Cir. 1996) (holding that the “bespeaks caution” doctrine was not 
applicable because of ambiguity in cautionary language); Fecht v. Price Co., 70 F.3d 1078, 
1082 (9th Cir. 1995) (stating that the “bespeaks caution” doctrine is only applicable where 
the information in the document, taken as a whole, is sufficiently cautionary). 
 155. See, e.g., Livid Holdings Ltd. v. Salomon Smith Barney, Inc., 416 F.3d 940, 948 
(9th Cir. 2005) (“[E]xtension of the bespeaks caution doctrine to statements of historical fact 
is inappropriate.”); EP Medsystems, Inc. v. EchoCath, Inc., 235 F.3d 865, 874 (3d Cir. 
2000) (“By its terms, the ‘bespeaks caution’ doctrine, like the safe harbor provision in the 
Reform Act, is directed only to forward-looking statements.”). 
 156. See Fedders, supra note 143, at 46 (discussing the lack of clarity in framework for 
determining materiality in the securities law context). 
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e Grove chose to 
write about it instead in a 1996 article for Fortune.  On the other 
 
D.   What Does This Mean for Mr. W, Mrs. Q, and Other Executives? 
Based on the previous discussion of the general disclosure obligations 
under the federal securities laws, it is not entirely clear what legal 
consequences Mr. W and Mrs. Q would face as a result of their 
misstatements and omissions.  Arguably, Mr. W’s and Mrs. Q’s illnesses 
and legal problems are of the type that “there is a substantial likelihood that 
a reasonable shareholder would consider it important,” and therefore are 
material and should be disclosed for securities law purposes.157  However, 
“[n]o company has ever been held to account by the SEC for failing to 
disclose information about its chief executive’s health[.]”158  Furthermore, 
since neither of their companies were aware of their respective private 
issues, such material misstatements and omissions may not be actionable, 
and investors will hav
for their grievances.  The scienter requirement under Section 10b-5 
and Section 17(a)(1),159 and the knowledge requirement under Section 12160 
may lead or have led companies to adopt a benign willful ignorance policy 
toward the material, private acts of their executives—“speak no evil, hear 
no evil, see no evil.” 
Current federal securities laws along with historic and wid
pted practices under such laws offer little clear guidance as to wha
any should do, besides not disclose, when it comes to facts like th
lving Mr. W and Mrs. Q.161  The absence of clarity under the curr
latory model has created a dangerous opaqueness for the invest
ic with disclosure practices varying from company to company:162 
When Intel . . . CEO Andy Grove was diagnosed with prostate 
cancer in 1995, he made no formal disclosur —
 
 157. TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 439 (1976). 
 Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 193 (1976) (holding that 
tions). 
ng the troubling lack of SEC guidance on 
e’s struggle with whether disclosure was required for CEO’s pancreatic 
 158. Nocera, supra note 7 at C1. 
 159. See Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680, 701-02 (1980) (holding that scienter is required 
for 17(a)(1) actions); Ernst & Ernst v.
scienter is required for 10(b) ac
 160. 15 U.S.C. 77l (2006). 
 161. See, e.g., Elkind, supra note 6 (reporti
material, private matters involving executives). 
 162. See Nocera, supra note 7, at C1 (“In 1995, when Andrew S. Grove, then the chief 
executive of Intel, received a diagnosis of prostate cancer, he informed the company’s board 
and management.  But he never told the company’s shareholders . . . .  On the other hand, 
when Charles H. Bell received a diagnosis of colorectal cancer shortly after he became the 
chief executive of McDonald’s in 2004, the company quickly released the news.  Mr. Bell 
resigned from the company that November, and died two months later.”); Elkind, supra note 
6 (discussing Appl
cancer diagnosis). 
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 regulatory clock, retrofitting the philosophy of 
caveat emptor for the philosophy of disclosure.164  A new, workable model 
e competing desires of the corporation, the 
executives, and the investing public is needed.  The following part proposes 
one s
 
hand, Berkshire Hathaway's Warren Buffett . . . issued a press 
release in June 2000 days after he learned he would need surgery 
to remove benign polyps along with part of his colon, even 
though the procedure was considered routine.163 
The absence of clarity and guidance under current regulations has 
essentially turned back the
approach that addresses th
uch model approach. 
IV.  A MODEL APPROACH 
There is no pure solution in any realistic, workable approach for 
additional executive disclosure of private, material facts.  Good practical 
solutions will likely be thematically inelegant, internally inconsistent, and 
often cross-cutting.  Weighing the executive’s desire for privacy against the 
investing public’s thirst for more material information165 is a delicate, 
difficult, but necessary balance if capital markets are to function better.  
However, the fulcrum of this balance is neither unique nor rare in modern 
society.  Consumers sacrifice personal privacy for the sake of market 
efficiency and higher standards of living.166  Every online transaction, 
every direct deposit, and every credit card purchase is the result of a model 
based on a careful balance between individual privacy and market 
efficiency.  In creating a workable model approach, privacy concerns must 
be cautiously considered, and some flexibility and deference must be given 
to companies as the facts and circumstances of each case are unique.  The 
model approach offered here is outlined by addressing three key questions:  
(1) Who should disclose?; (2) What should be disclosed?; and (3) How to 
disclose?  As discussed in greater detail below, this Article advocates a 
model approach that would first require principle-based disclosure by 
senior executives of material private information to their board of directors 
 
 163. Elkind, supra note 6. 
 164. See SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 186 (1963) (“A 
fundamental purpose, common to [the federal securities laws], was to substitute a 
philosophy of full disclosure for the philosophy of caveat emptor and thus to achieve a high 
standard of business ethics in the securities industry.”). 
 165. See SEC, Disclosure to Investors, supra note 29 (“Ongoing developments in 
technology have increased both the markets and investors demand for more timely company 
disclosure on the Web[.]”). 
 166. See JAMES B. RULE, PRIVACY IN PERIL:  HOW WE ARE SACRIFICING A FUNDAMENTAL 
RIGHT IN EXCHANGE FOR SECURITY AND CONVENIENCE 94-112 (2007) (critiquing the tradeoff 
of individual privacy for convenience in modern American life). 
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 Second, the approach requires that such 
disclosure be made available to the investing public within the current 
feder
close? 
 all 
exec ior 
offic (f) 
unde f) 
defin
th
d highly-compensated individuals that are not 
senio
conglomerates and critical engineers of technology-intensive companies 
 
or appropriate committee. 
al securities framework after the board independent of the disclosing 
executive determines that such disclosure is material and should be 
disclosed. 
A.   Who Should Dis
The obligation to disclose material information should rest with
utives and senior officers of the company.  “Executive” and “sen
er” in this instance means such persons as defined by Rule 16a-1
r the Exchange Act as an “officer” of the company.167  Rule 16a-1(
es “officer” as 
[A]n issuer's president, principal financial officer, principal 
accounting officer (or, if there is no such accounting officer, the 
controller), any vice-president of the issuer in charge of a 
principal business unit, division or function (such as sales, 
administration or finance), any other officer who performs a 
policy-making function, or any other person who performs 
similar policy-making functions for the issuer.  Officers of the 
issuer's parent(s) or subsidiaries shall be deemed officers of the 
issuer if they perform such policy-making functions for e 
issuer.  In addition, when the issuer is a limited partnership, 
officers or employees of the general partner(s) who perform 
policy-making functions for the limited partnership are deemed 
officers of the limited partnership.  When the issuer is a trust, 
officers or employees of the trustee(s) who perform policy-
making functions for the trust are deemed officers of the trust.168 
Admittedly, this class of persons obligated to disclose is both under-
inclusive and over-inclusive.  It is under-inclusive because it fails to 
capture certain influential an
r officers but may have a material impact on the company.  For 
example, key creative talents in the entertainment divisions of 
would be excluded from making material disclosures.169  On the flip-side, it 
 
 167. See Exchange Act Rule 16a-1(f), 17 C.F.R. § 240.16a-1(f) (2008) (defining terms 
relevant to Section 16 of the Exchange Act). 
 168. Id. 
 169. This approach is consistent with the SEC’s rules concerning executive 
compensation disclosures.  Under those rules the SEC, after significant pushback from 
corporations, decided to exclude from the required compensation disclosures “employees 
having no responsibility for significant policy decisions within the company, a significant 
subsidiary, or a principal business unit, division or function would be excluded when 
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and adoption.170  Since certain 
disclosure is already required under federal securities laws from senior 
scope and depth of their existing disclosure would 
be less burdensome than having additional requirements for new parties not 
accu
an individual’s private matters to the public.174  Under our model approach, 
 
is over-inclusive because it captures certain officers whose disclosures may 
not have a material impact. 
While our “senior officers” net inadvertently captures some small fish 
and lets some big fish escape, it is nonetheless preferable because it is 
faithful to the current framework.  Working within the current framework 
is operationally more feasible and less burdensome for companies because 
it minimizes legal costs for compliance 
officers, broadening the 
stomed to making such disclosures.171 
B.   What to Disclose? 
The disclosure of private information about anyone is a sensitive area 
that must be given due consideration.172  Disclosure of private information 
about senior executives is arguably more sensitive because of the positive 
and negative externalities that such information may have on a company’s 
stock and the investments of individual investors.173  Inappropriate amounts 
of information and inappropriate types of information can obfuscate the 
market’s ability to properly evaluate a company and can needlessly expose 
 
determining which employees are among the most highly compensated.”  See SEC, Changes 
et lost $1.4 trillion in value, 
 WAKE 
 Monsma & Timothy Olson, Muddling Through Counterfactual 
to Executive Compensation Disclosure, supra note 39 (discussing important changes for 
disclosure requirements and reasoning behind those changes). 
 170. See, e.g., Alstine, supra note 41, at 789-91 (examining the costs related to 
companies complying with new regulations under modern rulemaking regimes). 
 171. In the lead up to the implementation of the landmark Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 
companies spent billions of dollars trying to comply with the regulations.  Those costs could 
have been minimized had legislators made greater efforts to work within the existing system 
to provide additional safeguards for the public.  As a result, in the years following the 
implementation of Sarbanes-Oxley, lawmakers continue to refine  and amend the law to 
achieve  a better regulatory equilibrium.  See, e.g., Chang & Evans, supra note 60, at 51 
(“One study by Ivy Zhang estimated that the U.S. stock mark
which is over 10 percent of annual U.S. GDP, as a result of the legislative events leading up 
to the passage of Sarbanes-Oxley.  A ballpark estimate of the implementation costs of 
Sarbanes-Oxley is around $100 billion so, assuming the $1.4 trillion figure is correct, most 
of the estimated costs are indirect costs from the legislation.”). 
 172. See Joan MacLeod Hemingway, Personal Facts About Executive Officers:  A 
Proposal For Tailored Disclosures To Encourage Reasonable Investor Behavior, 42
FOREST L. REV. 749, 764-70 (2007) (discussing the various difficulties, sensitivities, and 
biases involved in making private facts concerning executives public). 
 173. See, e.g., Elkind, supra note 6 (discussing the tension between privacy and 
shareholder interests in connection with disclosing an executives health conditions). 
 174. See David
Materiality and Divergent Disclosure:  The Necessary Search for a Duty to Disclose 
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y and 
pred
noted that many companies already have internal policies179 that mandate 
 
we assume that the SEC would provide principle-based guidance on the 
types of events that should be disclosed if they are likely to have a material 
impact.175  As examples of such guidance, the SEC could state that where 
an executive’s private acts could present a potential conflict with their 
company’s interests then they should present such information to their 
board, or the SEC could state that an executive’s diagnosis for a terminal 
illness is information that should be disclosed to the board.  But regardless 
of the details of the underlying principles, a thematically-unified regulatory 
approach would have the virtue of enhancing the overall consistenc
ictability of disclosures.176  Moreover, once the marketplace adjusts 
their disclosures to reflect the principles, industry standards will likely be 
enhanced as companies adopt what they perceive as “best practices.” 
As a baseline consideration, what should be disclosed is information 
that is directly related to the executive deemed material for timely 
disclosure by the company’s board of directors or delegated committee.  
Examples of the type of information that should be disclosed about senior 
executives are diagnoses of a fatal illness,177 certain threatened criminal 
investigations, and certain meaningful outside investments.178  It should be 
 
Material Non-Financial Information, 26 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 137, 142 (2007) ("Not all 
information that is interesting to investors and analysts is material to the financial condition 
of a company[.]"). 
 175. Business leaders tend to favor a more flexible, principle-based regulatory regime, 
 the UK’s single, 
 t
he labor market for managers make 
investment to the extent that the board 
Principles (2008) available at 
 (2008), available at 
like those in the United Kingdom, rather than a rigid rules-based regime.  See Bloomberg & 
Schumer, supra note 39, at 17 (“Business leaders increasingly perceive
principles-based financial sector regulator—the Financial Services Authority (FSA)—as 
superior to what they see as a less responsive, complex US system of multiple holding 
company and industry segment regulators at the federal and state levels.”). 
 176. Bloomberg & Schumer, supra note 39, at 106 (discussing the benefits from 
certainty in he realm of enforcement from a unified regulatory scheme). 
 177. See Johnson, Magee et al., supra note 96, at 151-74 (“[C]ertain characteristics of 
managerial employment arrangements and of t
shareholder wealth dependent upon continued employment of an incumbent manager”); see 
also Morten Bennedsen, Francisco Perez-Gonzalez, and Daniel Wolfenzon, Do CEOs 
matter?, available at http://www.mccombs.utexas.edu/faculty/Francisco.Perez-
Gonzalez/valueceo.pdf (“[P]ersonal shocks that are the most. . . meaningful for CEOs. . 
.[include] the death of children and spouses. . . .”). 
 178. For example, if an executive decides to invests his entire net worth in a vineyard, 
his or shareholder should be made aware of such an 
determines that it will have a material impact on that executive’s ability to perform his or 
her duties.  See Liu & Yermack, supra note 23 at http://ssrn.com/abstract=970413 (studying 
the impact of private investment decisions of CEOs on the performance of their companies). 
 179. See generally General Electric, Governance 
http://www.ge.com/company/governance/principles/ 
governance_principles08.pdf (containing principles relating to directorship); Time Warner 
Inc, Corporate Governance Policy
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 executives.180  Codifying this principle and practice to make 
such
mstances, disclosure from non-principals should 
not be mandated as it may be too invasive regardless of the impact on the 
C.   
ch information is material and should be made 
avail
 
 
such disclosures and the SEC already requires the disclosure of certain 
transactions by
 disclosures standard would lead to better corporate governance in the 
marketplace. 
Given our proposed approach, it is likely that certain information that 
may have a material impact on the executive or the company should not 
need to be disclosed.  For example, a CEO with a seriously ill spouse or 
child may be adversely affected in his capacity to serve optimally as a 
senior officer.181  However, the disclosure of a spouse or child’s serious 
illness would likely fall outside the purview of required disclosure under 
our model approach.  Distinction should be made between the 
executive/principal and other parties because the executive is a duty-bound 
senior officer of the company, while other parties, such as friends and 
family members of the executive, are only tangentially connected to the 
company.  In most circu
related executive. 
How to Disclose? 
Disclosure should be done via a two-step process.  First, the disclosing 
senior officer should disclose in a timely manner the private information to 
the board of directors or the appropriate committee.182  Second, once the 
board determines that su
able to the public, it should be timely disclosed within the existing 
disclosure framework.183 
http://www.timewarner.com/corp/corp_governance/pdf/Corporate_Governance_Policy_020
8.pdf (“Corporate Governance Review and Disclosure”). 
 180. Regulation S-K requires executives to disclose transactions involving “related 
persons, promoters, and certain control persons.”  See 17 C.F.R. 229.404 (2008) (requiring 
 committee designated by the 
ives the board great latitude in unveiling or shielding 
disclosure of certain relationships and transactions). 
 181. See Maremont, supra note 26, at A1 (reporting that a study which indicated a 
decline in a company’s profitability following the death of its CEO’s spouse or child); 
Bennedsen et al., supra note 177 (“[P]ersonal shocks that are the most . . . meaningful for 
CEOs . . . [include] the death of children and spouses . . . .”). 
 182. All companies listed on the New York Stock Exchange and NASDAQ Stock 
Market are required to have Audit Committees and Corporate Governance Committees 
consisting entirely of independent directors to make objective decisions related to the 
company and its executives.  Such committees, or a special
board of directors, can weigh the materiality of the executive’s disclosure and determine 
whether it merits disclosure to the public.  See NYSE Listed Company Manual, Section 
303A (addressing the corporate governance standards for listed companies); FINRA NASD 
Manual, NASD Rule 4350 (“Audit committees are required to have a minimum of three 
members and be comprised only of independent directors.”). 
 183. The second step admittedly g
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 articulated by the SEC, and so 
discl
 
The first step of this process—disclosure to the board—already occurs 
in many companies with good corporate governance and forthcoming 
executives, so it should be minimally burdensome from an administrative 
perspective.184  Admittedly, the first step gives some deference to 
executives and trusts that they will disclose certain private, personal 
matters to the board in a timely manner.  Given that executives under the 
current regulatory regime already need to make similar disclosures, such 
deference is not irrational.185  Moreover, our model approach exists in the 
context of principle-based guidance
osing executives and their boards will have some direction on what 
types of matters they should disclose. 
The second step of this process—determination by the board—like the 
first step, already takes place in some boardrooms in America.  However, 
disclosure guided by an SEC-articulated principle offers greater uniformity 
and fairness in the marketplace and allows for the timely disclosure of 
material information to the investing public.186  The board or a designated 
committee—duty-bound to the company and its shareholders187—should 
make the decision independent of the relevant executive,188 and that 
executive should have no active influence over the decision.189  Once the 
 
an executive officer’s personal matters.  However, presuming good corporate governance, 
no panel or person is in a better position to make that determination on behalf of the 
. 505, 513-14 (1983) 
dent management investigation—are not cost-
ives). 
hen the audit committee, 
ment to discuss affairs of the company). 
company and its shareholders than the independent members of the company’s board of 
directors.  See Fedders, supra note 143, at 46 (discussing the difficulties and subjectivity 
involved in determining materiality). 
 184. See A.A. Sommer, Jr., Internal Controls, 61 N.C. L. REV
(describing the ease with which disclosures can be made); Steven Chasin, Insider v. Issuer:  
Resolving and Preventing Insider Trading Compliance Policy Disputes, 50 UCLA L. REV. 
859, 861-64 (2003) (discussing insider trading compliance policies). 
 185. Requiring executives to self-report to their management certain private matters may 
lead to a difficult personal decision for the executive, but alternatives to self-reporting—
such as mandated disclosure or indepen
effective and practical.  Contra Hemingway, supra note 172, at 790-94 (proposing 
mandatory disclosure and independent company investigation as a means to gather material, 
disclosable information about execut
 186. See Sommer, supra note 184, at 513-17 (noting the importance of compliance 
policies to relations with the SEC); Chasin, supra note 184, at 861-64 (discussing the harms 
of ambiguous compliance policies). 
 187. North American Catholic Educational Programming Foundation, Inc. v. Gheewalla, 
930 A.2d 92, 98 (Del. 2007) (“It is well established that the directors owe fiduciary 
obligations to the corporation and its shareholders.”). 
 188. This is common practice in many companies especially w
compensation committee or a special committee is meeting on sensitive matters concerning 
company executives.  See NYSE Rule 303A.03 (requiring independent directors to meet 
regularly without manage
 189. See Hemingway, supra note 172, at 765-70 (highlighting various biases and 
problems that make it less than optimal to have the relevant executive have influence over 
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riate, the company should also 
inclu n191 
of it art 
Omn -K 
the f
p ation and popularity of our founder, Martha Stewart, and 
anagement since they are often in the best position194 to judge 
how certain private matters of an executive is going to impact the 
195
 
decision to disclose is made, it should be done via the existing regulatory 
framework.  For example, a company, where appropriate, may disclose the 
terminal illness of its CEO through a Form 8-K, a Form 10K, or through its 
website.190  Additionally, where approp
de meaningful, specific narrative disclosure in the risk factor sectio
s annual report on Form 10K.192  For example, Martha Stew
imedia, Inc. includes in its publicly-filed annual report on Form 10
ollowing language in its risk factors: 
Our success depends in part on the popularity of our brands and 
the re ut
any adverse reactions to publicity relating to Ms. Stewart, or the 
loss of her services, could adversely affect our revenues, results 
of operations and our ability to maintain or generate a consumer 
base.193 
This second step, like the first step, codifies the “best practices” in the 
market and places the responsibility on the company’s management to 
make the appropriate judgment regarding the executive’s private 
information.  Because each company, each executive, and each situation is 
unique, some deference should be given to the business judgment of the 
company’s m
company.   Consistent with established law, companies—not regulators 
 
the disclosure decision). 
 190. Consistent with current practice, flexibility should be given the company in terms of 
n be disclosed through both a Form 8-K 
rmation about market risk . . . .”). 
dependence on certain key personnel.  Under our model approach, risks related 
 10-K), at 19 (Feb. 29, 
how it chooses to disclose within the current regulatory framework.  For example, an 
executive’s initial diagnoses with colon cancer ca
and the company’s website.  Depending on timing, if additional information becomes 
available, the company can include a risk factor in its annual report on Form 10-K speaking 
to the executive’s diagnosis of cancer and its potential impact on the company.  See SEC, 
SEC Disclosures to Investors, supra note 29. 
 191. 17 C.F.R. § 229.305 (2008) (“Registrants shall provide, in their reporting currency, 
quantitative info
 192. Many companies include “key persons” risk factors that alert investors about the 
company’s 
to certain private matters involving executives would similarly be disclosed in the annual 
report.  See, e.g., Berkshire Hathaway, Inc., Annual Report (Form
2008) (“Berkshire is dependent for its investment and capital allocation decisions on a few 
key people.”). 
 193. Martha Stewart Living Omnimedia, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 12 (Mar. 
17, 2008). 
 194. See Del. Gen. Corp. L. Sec. 141(a) (stating the responsibility of directors under 
Delaware law to manage the operations and affairs of a company). 
 195. See Edward B. Rock & Michael L. Wachter, Islands of Conscious Power:  Law, 
Norms, and the Self-Governing Corporation, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1619, 1621–24 (2001) 
(positing that deference to business judgment allows for flexible and meaningful corporate 
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or ju
y 
only need clarification.  The absence of additional rules should minimize 
swifter compliance to the new practice.197 
V. 
es about requiring additional disclosures from public company 
executives are the “status quo” critique, corporate concerns, and privacy 
A. 
 
dges—should initially decide with regulatory guidance what may be 
material. 196 
It is worth noting that under the proposed model approach no new 
rules may need to be proposed; instead, existing rules and practices ma
compliance costs and make for 
CRITIQUES & CONCERNS 
Rule proposals and guidance from administrative agencies usually 
generate some critique and concern from implicated parties.  Rule 
proposals and guidance from the SEC that implicate the interests of 
industry titans and personal privacy will likely generate much critique, 
concern, and consternation.198  Broadly, three chief categories of concerns 
and critiqu
concerns. 
The Status Quo Critique 
The “status quo” critique is in many ways a default and reflexive 
response to new guidance or regulations from the SEC (or any regulatory 
body).  The critique often operates on two main strains, the sufficiency 
strain and the extra-regulatory strain.  The sufficiency strain argues that the 
status quo of the existing framework is sufficient to deal with whatever 
issues the new proposed regulations are meant to address.  Polemically and 
practically, the sufficiency strain goes along the lines of:  “We don’t need 
more rules.  We need to properly enforce the rules that we have on the 
 
governance by individual companies). 
 196. Under the “business judgment rule,” courts have often deferred to management on 
business matters regardless of how problematic they may turn out to be in hindsight.  See, 
e.g., Gearhart Indus. Inc. v. Smith Int’l Inc., 741 F.2d 707, 721 (5th Cir. 1984) (outlining the 
ns of business judgment rule); Kamin v. Am. Express Co., 383 
g to the existence of a new legal norm.”); Matwyshyn, supra note 41, at 199-202 
isclosure, supra note 39 
st.”). 
business judgment rule); Berwald v. Mission Dev. Co., 185 A.2d 480, 482–83 (Del. 1962) 
(detailing the ramificatio
N.Y.S.2d 807, 810 (Sup. Ct. 1976), aff’d 387 N.Y.S.2d 993 (App. Div. 1976) (stating the 
business judgment rule). 
 197. See, e.g., Alstine, supra note 41, at 793 (“[A] legal system will incur costs simply in 
adjustin
(noting that making changes within the existing federal securities law regime can minimize 
costs). 
 198. See SEC, SEC Changes to Executive Compensation D
(“With more than 20,000 comments, and counting, it is now official that no issue in the 72 
years of the Commission's history has generated such intere
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ork.”200  These are issues that can be better dealt with by the 
mark
the extra-regulatory strain is correct in postulating that there are certain 
problems that may be better addressed with market or other extra-
 
books.”199  The extra-regulatory strain argues that the status quo of the 
existing framework is adequate because the issues to be dealt with by the 
proposed rules are fundamentally extra-regulatory issues that cannot be 
properly addressed by more rules.  Polemically and practically, the extra-
regulatory strain goes along the lines of:  “We don’t need more rules.  Let 
the markets w
et (or some extra-regulatory force).”201  These two strains frequently 
serve as the basis for interrelated corporate arguments that implicate 
regulatory cost burdens on businesses and comparative advantage in the 
presence of overregulation (which will be discussed in greater detail in the 
next part).202 
While the duel-strained status quo critique may be perceived as 
reflexive and shallow, it is not without merit.  The sufficiency strain is 
correct in postulating that existing securities regulations need more 
vigorous enforcement and faithful compliance.203  Some scholars and 
industry experts have argued that the corporate debacles of 
Enron,WorldCom, and their ilk came not only from rule-breaking, but from 
a lack of enforcement, oversight,204 and honest compliance.205  Likewise, 
 
 199. See, e.g, Michelle Singletary, Another Lending Commission?  Forget It—We Need 
isclose). 
at market solutions are pretty good at limiting corporate misbehavior—the recent 
 highlighted the shortcoming in the financial institution’s gatekeepers, 
orate 
artially is not the second best option to applying them consistently.”). 
to Enforce Existing Laws, BOSTON GLOBE, April 27, 2008. 
 200. See Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Mandatory Disclosure and the 
Protection of Investors, 70 VA. L. REV. 669, 683 (1984) (contending that absent mandatory 
disclosure in securities laws, the market will reward or punish companies that d
 201. See, e.g., Chang & Evans, supra note 60, at 51 (“[T]here are a number of reasons to 
believe th
spate of corporate shenanigans notwithstanding—and that heavy-handed regulation and 
zealous prosecution are a bit like using an elephant gun to shoot a tarantula.”). 
 202. See Alstine, supra note 41, at 793 (examining the legal costs in light of regulatory 
change). 
 203. See Larry E. Ribstein, Market vs. Regulatory Responses to Corporate Fraud:  A 
Critique of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 28 IOWA L.J. OF CORP. L. 1,  21-37 (2003) 
(explaining that the frauds that gave rise to Sarbanes Oxley may have been prevented 
through better enforcement and proper adherence to the then-existing regulations). 
 204. Some scholars have suggested that the failures of Enron and other corporate 
scandals of that period
namely, auditors and attorneys.  See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., Gatekeeper Failure and 
Reform:  The Challenge of Fashioning Relevant Reforms, 84 B.U. L. REV. 301, 301-10, 349-
52 (2004) (examining the failure of the gatekeepers and the stricter liability standards 
imposed as a result). 
 205. See Ribstein, supra note 203 (reviewing the issues with Enron and other corp
frauds). See generally Pandit, supra note 36 (“An uneven application of regulations and 
accounting standards in an environment where capital and talent are mobile and where 
traditional classifications are being redefined has the potential to increase systemic risk.  
Applying rules p
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eaningful and 
unde
 
regulatory mechanisms.  For example, while the SEC may require 
additional disclosures on executive compensation,206 m
rstandable disclosure may not necessarily follow and will more likely 
come through discussions within the industry and feedback from the 
marketplace at large after the first cycle of disclosures.207 
While the status quo critique has much merit in its opposition to more 
rules governing disclosure relating to executive officers, its arguments 
come up short.  While existing federal securities rules need more vigorous 
enforcement and faithful compliance, from time to time, they also need to 
be updated, amended, and supplemented to account for new developments 
and practices in the marketplace.208  “[T]he American economy does not 
stand still, and neither should the rules that govern it.  The evolution of 
industries often warrants regulatory reform—to foster competition, lower 
prices, or replace outdated oversight structures.”209  Securities regulations, 
being reactionary in nature, often play tortoise to the market hare, 
especially in a globalized financial market—falling behind and needing a 
market stumble to catch up.  The global financial marketplace and exotic 
financial products210 have also diminished the strength and reach of federal 
regulators who have limited resources and limited jurisdiction.211  Federal 
 
 206. See SEC Final Rule, Executive Compensation and Related Person Disclosure, 17 
C.F.R. § 228, 229 (2006); see also SEC, Changes to Executive Compensation Disclosure, 
ess, to decipher. Pay 
sury Secretary Henry Paulson’s call for a new regulatory system, finding that the 
 the 
 The Report of the CRMPG III, 70-75 (Aug. 6, 2008) (calling attention 
wnership and management 
supra note 39 (outlining the SEC’s adoption of principle-based disclosures for executive 
compensation). 
 207. See Dash, supra note 1, at A1 (“But while all the new disclosure rules have resulted 
in far more information, analysts say they still do not necessarily offer greater insight . . . .  
Many shareholders say the new proxies require more work, not l
consultants say some of the new data is so dizzying that they are not sure how to sift through 
it; some charts even require another set of charts to interpret them.”). 
 208. See, e.g., Julia Werdigier, Paulson Calls for Strong Regulators, N.Y. TIMES, July 
31, 2008 available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/07/03/business/worldbusiness/03treasury.html (reporting 
U.S. Trea
current system is outdated and does not address the new innovations in the financial 
market). 
 209. Senator Barack Obama, Remarks of Senator Barack Obama:  Renewing
American Economy (March 27, 2008), available at 
http://www.barackobama.com/2008/03/27/remarks_of_senator_barack_obam_54.php. 
 210. See, e.g., Counterparty Risk Management Policy Group, Containing Systemic Risk:  
The Road to Reform
to the lack of risk monitoring and risk management regulations in an increasing complex 
financial system). 
 211. See David Rothkopf, What Power Looks Like, NEWSWEEK (Int’l Ed.) Apr. 14, 2008, 
at 38, available at http://news.uk.msn.com/newsweek.aspx?cp-documentid=7992352 
(“[N]ational institutions are ineffective beyond their borders and international institutions 
have not evolved as quickly as global markets, many retaining o
structures dating to the late 1940s with resources inadequate to many global challenges [.]”). 
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regu
 Treasury Secretary 
Henr
 
 
lators at the SEC and the Federal Reserve during the credit crisis of 
2007 and 2008 were ill-equipped under outdated regulatory framework to 
prevent and address the crisis.212  As result, various new proposals were 
made by the US Treasury Department to address regulatory insufficiencies 
in light of modern market conditions.213 
Generally, free markets work, albeit sometimes in a blunt and violent 
manner.  Yet, free markets can also work better and smoother with proper 
incentives and refinements.  While there are many market-based and extra-
regulatory cures to the securities market’s ills and defects,214 those cures 
are often imperfect and untimely, and need some motivation from the 
government.  Sometimes markets are self-reinforcing instead of self-
correcting.  Absent external pressures and incentives from regulators, it is 
unlikely that private industry will impose meaningful higher standards and 
checks on themselves or come together in a timely fashion to solve its own 
shortcomings.215  The threat of regulation or actual intervention from 
government has in the past served as the impetus for industry self-reform or 
corrective, systemic action.  For example, in 2008,
y Paulson and Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke urged J.P. 
Morgan and other banks to act swiftly to purchase Bear Stearns in order to 
stem a global financial catastrophe.216  Such public-private collaboration in 
the financial sector in such a context is more likely to happen at the urging 
of government than profit-driven private enterprise.217 
 212. See Werdigier, supra note 208 and accompanying text. 
ions that could immediately improve and reform the U.S. regulatory 
 that that the stock exchange can serve as a primarily regulator of 
ook 
al regulators and 
in the bailout of Bear Stearns given the significant 
 213. See DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY, THE DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY 
BLUEPRINT FOR A MODERNIZED FINANCIAL REGULATORY STRUCTURE 1 (Mar. 1, 2008) (“In 
this report, Treasury presents a series of ‘short-term’ and ‘intermediate-term’ 
recommendat
structure.”). 
 214. See, e.g., Roberta Romano, Empowering Investors:  A Market Approach to 
Securities Regulation, 107 YALE L.J. 2359, 2359-65, 2395-2400 (1998) (proposing market-
based alternatives rooted in state law and self-regulatory organization to the existing federal 
securities law regime); Paul Mahoney, The Exchange as Regulator, 83 VA. L. REV. 1453, 
1453-58 (1997) (positing
the securities industry). 
 215. Because of greater public scrutiny—both regulated and not—some companies have 
taken stricter position concerning the private behavior of their executives.  Cf. Carol 
Hymowitz, Personal Boundaries Shrink as Companies Punish Bad Behavior, WALL ST. J., 
June 18, 2007, at B1 (“As with politicians, today's ambitious business managers need to be 
aware that their personal behavior will be as closely scrutinized and judged as their work 
performance. Corporate directors are far less willing than they were a few years ago to l
the other way if an executive does something that threatens to embarrass a company.”). 
 216. See Bryan Burrough, Bring Down Bear Stearns, VANITY FAIR, Aug. 2008, at 106 
(chronicling the fall of Bear Stearns and the collaboration between feder
J.P. Morgan to purchase Bear Stearns to prevent a global financial crises). 
 217. See, e.g., id. (detailing how J.P. Morgan, absent the intervention and assistance of 
federal regulators, was unwilling to assist 
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.220  Absent governmental regulators, who is going to cause 
CEOs and other industry titans to disclose what can be perceived as 
flicts material to the company and its 
shareholders?221  Therefore, in the area of executive officers’ disclosures, 
new 
undoubtedly raise some corporate resistance.222  Chiefly, companies, 
executives, and their supporters will likely argue that the additional 
223
 
In the case of additional rules requiring more disclosure from 
executive officers, the existing regulatory framework is lacking and extra-
regulatory solutions to potential problems are unlikely to bear fruit in the 
near term.  As previously discussed, existing rules and practices concerning 
disclosure relating to executive officers leaves shareholders and the 
marketplace vulnerable.218  Moreover, there appears to be little incentive 
and motivation in the near term for executive officers to make additional 
personal disclosures.  Executive accountability to a growing investor base 
has not grown at the same rate as executive compensation.219  Greater 
rewards should arguably come with greater accountability and 
transparency
personal foibles and con
rules or reinterpretations of existing rules may be warranted given the 
status quo. 
B. Corporate Concerns 
Requiring additional disclosure from public company executives will 
regulations will impose unnecessary costs on the company  and could 
 
risk involved in a solely private bailout). 
 218. Supra Part III.D. 
 219. Many critics point out that executive compensation has increased to an 
unreasonable level at the expense of shareholders without asking for much in return from 
the executives.  See Yermack, supra note 58 (discussing CEO perks, particularly the use of 
corporate planes); Nick Bunkley, Ford Pays Chief $28 Million for 4 Months’ Work, N.Y. 
TIMES, April 6, 2008 (“[In 2007,] the Ford Motor Company paid its new chief executive, 
Alan R. Mulally, $28.18 million in his first four months on the job . . . .”); Eric Dash, Has 
(“At America’s 
te 219 (discussing the 
mpensation 
Disclosure, supra note 39 (“With more than 20,000 
the Exit Sign Ever Looked So Good?, N.Y. TIMES, April 8, 2007, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/04/08/business/yourmoney/08axe.html 
biggest companies, it was possible for chief executives to fumble, fudge or fail to deliver 
results—and yet still walk away with more money than most people earn in a lifetime.”). 
 220. See Dash, Has the Exit Sign Ever Looked So Good?, supra no
exit packages of the chief executives of America’s biggest companies). 
 221. Contra Roberta Romano, Empowering Investors:  A Market Approach to Securities 
Regulation, 107 YALE L.J. 2359, 2399-2403 (1998) (proposing a securities regulation 
regime based self-regulatory organizations such as stock exchanges). 
 222. In 2006, when the SEC proposed new rules concerning executive co
disclosure, it generated the most comments in the history of SEC rule proposals.  See SEC, 
Changes to Executive Compensation 
comments, and counting, it is now official that no issue in the 72 years of the Commission's 
history has generated such interest.” (quoting SEC chairman Christopher Cox)). 
 223. See, e.g., Alstine, supra note 41, at 789-94 (examining the compliance costs of new 
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aterial private disclosure 
abou
ng public company executives228 either through 
ascen
 
 
have a chilling effect on potential executives, and the U.S. capital markets 
for initial public offerings.224  These concerns are legitimate because 
regulators have acted in reactionary and blunt manners in the past.225  
However, when taken into consideration and balanced against creating 
better corporate governance and more public trust in the securities market, 
regulations requiring more meaningful and m
t executive officers that respect the privacy of executives and the 
business judgment of companies is desirable.226 
From a financial costs perspective, the costs for requiring and 
producing additional disclosure by executive officers, as proposed, are 
minimal because it works within the current regulatory apparatus.  
Arguably, no new rules need to be imposed, no new monitoring mechanism 
is needed, and no new board committees are required.  The greatest cost is 
likely not a financial one, but an emotional and psychological one; it is the 
toll that is exacted from the disclosing executive and their family.227  That 
cost, while unquantifiable in financial terms, may be significant enough to 
have a chilling effect on qualified, but very private, people who are 
considering becomi
sion in a public company or through an initial public offering of a 
private company.229 
laws and regulations for companies). 
J. 
gulations can stunt and stifle economic growth, smart, 
ic expansion.  The history of the 
 stressful or emotionally charged situations (e.g., under 
during the course of a divorce or 
ey, The Costs of Being Public After Sarbanes-Oxley:  
 224. Regulatory costs imposed on public companies can have an effect on existing public 
companies as well as companies that are considering taking themselves public.  Absent 
clear, sensible regulations and implementation, new rules can have adverse impact on 
capital markets in this country.  See Bloomberg & Schumer, supra note 39, at ii (“[O]ur 
regulatory framework is a thicket of complicated rules, rather than a streamlined set of 
commonly understood principles, as is the case in the United Kingdom and elsewhere.  The 
flawed implementation of the 2002 Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX), which produced far heavier 
costs than expected, has only aggravated the situation . . . .”); Nathan Wilda, David Pays 
For Goliath’s Mistakes:  The Costly Effect Sarbanes-Oxley Has On Small Companies, 38 
MARSHALL L. REV. 671, 671-80 (2004) (discussing how Sarbanes-Oxley did not properly 
take into account its impact on smaller companies, which resulted in serious costs burdens 
on small public companies and small private companies contemplating a public offering). 
 225. Whereas obtuse, rigid re
principled regulation can coexist with and spur econom
American stock markets serve as anecdotal proof that market growth can run on parallel 
tracks with regulatory expansion. 
 226. See supra Part IV (outlining a model approach). 
 227. See Hemingway, supra note 172, at 767-68 (“[E]xecutives must make these 
decisions in what may be highly
threat of criminal prosecution or civil enforcement, in the wake of a medical diagnosis of a 
serious or terminal illness, at a time of financial strife, or 
nonpublic extramarital affair).”). 
 228. See generally Kenji Yoshino, Covering, 111 YALE L.J. 769 (2002) (discussing 
covering in the context of discrimination and civil rights). 
 229. See generally William J. Carn
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markets235 may add costs to companies and their executives in the near 
 
 
The chilling effect of additional private disclosures is mitigated by the 
two-part disclosure process, the presumably enticing compensation of 
being a public company executive,230 and the allure of public funds.  The 
proposed two-part disclosure process only publicizes the private 
information after confidential deliberation about whether such private 
information is material to a reasonable investor.  Absent extenuating 
circumstances, it is unlikely that frivolous, irrelevant, and perhaps 
embarrassing information would be disclosed by a company.  Absen
rm standard, as under the proposed model, companies will continue to 
disclose diversely or not at all because of privacy and other concerns.231 
While the chilling effect of additional disclosure requirements may 
give momentary pause to private entrepreneurs thinking about making an 
initial public offering in the United States, the warmth emanating from the 
draw, integrity, and strength of the US capital markets will likely prove too 
tempting to resist.232  During the implementation of Sarbanes Oxley in 
2002, some argued that the additional regulations would lead to a serious 
decline in initial public offerings in the US markets and a mass exodus to 
foreign markets.233  Nearly a decade after Sarbanes Oxley, that fear has not 
materialized.234  Maintaining high standards of integrity in the U.S. capital 
The Irony of “Going Private,” 55 EMORY L.J. 141, 141-48 (2006) (criticizing the heavy 
compliance costs of Sarbanes-Oxley on small companies and its chilling effect on public 
offerings in the U.S. capital markets). 
 230. See Dash, supra note 1, at A1 (discussing compensation packages and perks of 
ng perks as 
rgaret E. Tahyar, Increasing the Attractiveness 
ey Institute, (Oct. 12, 2006) (“[T]he percentage of American companies which 
o
entation of SOX, but also to undertake broader reforms, using a principles 
public company executives); Yermack, supra note 58 (discussing the role of perquisites in 
managerial compensation); Rajan & Wulf, supra note 58 (examining how treati
merely managerial excess is incorrect). 
 231. See Nocera, supra note 7, at C1 (discussing the reluctance of companies to talk 
about private matters concerning their executives because of privacy concerns). 
 232. See Richard D. Truesdell, Jr. & Ma
of U.S. Capital Markets to Foreign Private Issuers, THE REVIEW OF SECURITIES & 
COMMODITIES REGULATION, April, 2008, at 37 (discussing the attractiveness of U.S. capital 
markets in light of recent SEC regulations). 
 233. See, e.g., Chang & Evans, supra note 60, at 51 (“The available evidence suggests 
that companies have had a greater likelihood of staying or going private, and of choosing a 
non-U.S. stock exchange for an IPO, following Sarbanes-Oxley.”). 
 234. See Annette L. Nazareth, SEC Commissioner, Remarks Before the ALI-ABA 
Sarbanes-Oxl
c nduct their IPOs in the U.S. has remained steady.”); contra Bloomberg & Schumer, supra 
note 39, at 43 (citing evidence that suggest a migration of initial public offerings from U.S. 
exchanges). 
 235. See Marcel Kahan, Securities Law and the Social Costs of “Inaccurate” Stock 
Prices, 41 DUKE L.J. 977, 978-82 (1992) (discussing how securities regulations maintain 
high integrity in capital markets and reduce the social costs associated with inefficient 
prices); Bloomberg & Schumer, supra note 39, at ii (“The time has come not only to re-
examine implem
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ends through more investment 
motivated by greater trust in the markets.236 
C. Privacy Concerns 
ary capital 
mark
 
 
term, but will ultimately pay greater divid
Requiring additional disclosure from public company executives that 
include certain material private matters will undoubtedly raise concerns 
about the individual’s privacy rights.  These privacy concerns are 
legitimate, but must be examined in the context of contempor
ets, the enhanced role of the executive, and modern media. 
 While there is no consensus on a definition of privacy,237 there is 
greater consensus that all persons have a right to privacy.  That right to 
privacy, like its varied meanings, is neither uniform nor absolute—lines are 
drawn, exceptions are made, rules are discriminately applied.238  When it 
comes to public company executives, their privacy rights are not like those 
of an ordinary, private citizen because there is a meaningful “public 
based approach to eliminate duplication and inefficiencies in our regulatory system.  And 
we must do both while ensuring that we maintain our strong protections for investors and 
consumers.”). 
 236. See Nazareth, supra note 234 and accompanying text (“The United States 
historically has been a leader in the area of corporate governance. . . . We cannot let our 
rules stagnate lest they become impediments to progress and to investment in America's 
capital markets.”); contra Barbara Ann Banoff, Regulatory Subsidies, Efficient Markets, and 
PRIVACY AND THE CONDUCT OF 
Shelf Registration:  An Analysis of Rule 415, 70 VA. L. REV. 135, 175-81 (1984) (suggesting 
that certain new regulations which improve market confidence and pricing are not justified 
by the costs imposed on issuers and underwriters in public offerings). 
 237. See e.g., 41 Am. Jur. Privacy § 2 (1942) (defining privacy, in part, as the right of a 
person to be free from unwarranted publicity); see also ANITA L. ALLEN, UNEASY ACCESS:  
PRIVACY FOR WOMEN IN A FREE SOCIETY 34 (1988) (“[P]rivacy denotes a degree of 
inaccessibility of persons, their mental states, and information about them to the senses and 
surveillance devices of others.”); SISSELA BOK, SECRETS:  ON THE ETHICS OF CONCEALMENT 
& REVELATION, 10-11 (1983) (“[P]rivacy [i]s the condition of being protected from 
unwanted access by others–either physical access, personal information or attention.”); 
ALAN WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM 7 (The Association of the Bar of the city of New 
York 1967) (“Privacy is the claim of individuals, groups or institutions to determine for 
themselves when, how, and to what extent information about them is communicated to 
others.”); Ruth Gavison, Privacy and the Limits of Law, 89 YALE L.J. 421, 428 (1980) 
(“[P]rivacy is a limitation of others’ access to an individual. . . . [A]n individual enjoys 
perfect privacy when he is completely inaccessible to others.”); Tom Gerety, Redefining 
Privacy, 12 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 233, 236 (1977) (defining privacy as autonomy or 
control over the intimacies of personal identity); Hyman Gross, The Concept of Privacy, 42 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 34, 35-36 (1967) (“[P]rivacy is the condition of human life in which 
acquaintance with a person or with affairs of his life which are personal to him is limited.”). 
 238. See DAVID KORN, MEDICAL INFORMATION 
BIOMEDICAL RESEARCH, PRIVACY AND HEALTHCARE (Biomedical Ethics Reviews) 107 
(James M. Humber & Robert F. Almeder eds., 2001) (“[I]n contemporary society there is 
and can be no absolute right to privacy.”). 
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ublic companies 
shou
 
 
interest” in their private matters.239  The privacy rights of public company 
executives are more akin to those of celebrities240 and public officials in 
that they arguably have a lower expectation of privacy and cannot be 
expected to be “let alone.”241  Our elected federal politicians are required 
by law to make certain financial disclosures about their personal 
finances,242 and they expect that their private lives will be fair game to the 
media.  Likewise, celebrities understand that their privacy rights are not 
like those of the ordinary citizen because they are “public figures” under 
the law.243  Akin to celebrities,244 executives who run p
ld reasonably expect to abdicate a certain level of privacy.245 
The proliferation of modern media has increased the public’s appetite 
for information about public figures.246  The proliferation of new media 
coupled with the growth in securities investing by ordinary citizens has 
further intensified coverage of public company executives.247  Perpetual 
business news channels, websites, chat rooms, and blogs all exist to satisfy 
the public’s insatiable appetite for more information.248  As a result, actions 
of public company officials are closely monitored, and their “zone of 
privacy”249 and “expectation of privacy”250 have diminished in the 21st 
 239. See Maremont, supra note 26, at A1 (discussing scholarship that studied the impact 
, Hiring a Celebrity CEO, BOARD MEMBER MAGAZINE, 
potential gains and perils of a 
1, 92 (Cal. Ct. App. 1931) 
e Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 324 (1974) (holding that when the 
n re Franchard Corp., 42 S.E.C. 163, 174 (1964) (noting how the solicitation of 
he days 
.”); see also SEC, Disclosure to Investors 
 
atters, 
of CEO’s private lives on their companies); Bennedsen et al., supra note 177 (examining the 
impact of certain events in the private lives of the CEO on firm performance). 
 240. See, e.g., John R. Engen
Winter 2000 (discussing the celebrity status of a CEO and the 
hiring a celebrity CEO). 
 241. Melvin v. Reid, 297 P.2d 9
 242. See http://www.opensecrets.org/pfds/index.php (cataloguing financial disclosure 
forms of federal elected officials). 
 243. Se
media defames a private individual, it cannot claim a constitutional privilege against 
liability). 
 244. See HAIGH, supra note 62, at 96-103 (describing the ascent to cult status of the CEO 
in contemporary society). 
 245. See I
public funds for a company can result in diminished levels of privacy for that company’s 
executives). 
 246. See Edwin Lawrence Godkin, The Rights Of The Citizen, IV. —To His Own 
Reputation, 8 SCRIBNER’S MAG. 58, 66 (July 1890) (“The chief enemy of privacy in modern 
life is that interest in other people and their affairs known as curiosity, which in t
before newspapers created personal gossip
(exploring how public companies can effectively disclose information to investors). 
 247. See HAIGH, supra note 62, at 97-99.
 248. See Clifford & Anderson, supra note 38 (discussing the growth of new sources of 
information for business news and gossip). 
 249. See Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 598-99 (discussing how the appellees contend 
that the statute invades a constitutionally protected “zone of privacy.”).  The cases 
sometimes characterized as protecting “privacy” have in fact involved at least two different 
kinds of interests.  One is the individual interest in avoiding disclosure of personal m
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, should reasonably 
be ex
e immaterial and irrelevant to the 
investing public will remain undisclosed. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
tory 
safeg
 
Century.  Additional regulated disclosure, as proposed
pected to fit into this shrunken zone of privacy.   
Being a public company executive comes with the occupational 
hazard of less privacy, which is compensated for in terms of prestige, 
perks, and money.251  Nonetheless, due consideration must be given to the 
disclosure of private, material matters of executives.  Matters such as 
serious illness, pending divorce, and potential crime can be legally complex 
and deeply personal,252 and deciding to disclose such matters must be done 
with due consideration for the executive.  Under this Article’s proposed 
two-step model approach, reasonable deference is given to the disclosing 
executive and the judgment of the company’s management.253  Only private 
matters determined to be material and proper for timely disclosure will be 
made public, while private matters that ar
Disclosing material private matters of public company executives is a 
difficult and complex but sometimes necessary act.  Advocates that favor 
more disclosure and advocates that favor more privacy both have many 
legitimate arguments and concerns.  In this Article, I have argued that when 
viewed in the context of contemporary capital markets, the enhanced role 
of the executive, and the modern media additional disclosure from 
executives about material, private matters is desirable.  In support of this 
argument, I have proposed a principle-based model approach that affords 
companies and executives reasonable deference on what to disclose and 
how to disclose it, while simultaneously strengthening regula
uards for the investing public with minimal compliance burdens. 
This model approach for addressing the issue of material, private 
matters of executives, while sensible, will not be quickly implemented.  No 
 
and another is the interest in independence in making certain kinds of important decisions. 
 250. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 362 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring). 
 251. See Rajan & Wulf, supra note 58 (explaining how perks are not simply managerial 
excess); see also Yermack, supra note 58 (examining the perks involved for executive 
officers). 
 252. See Glenn, supra note 25, at 542-43 (discussing potential conflicts between SEC 
requirements and the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 in the context of disclosing 
executive illness); see also Hemingway, supra note 172, at 764-770 (raising potential 
privacy, First Amendment, and Fifth Amendment issues in the context of executive 
disclosure).  See generally Antony Page & Katy Yang, Controlling Corporate Speech:  Is 
Regulation Fair Disclosure Unconstitutional?, 39 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1 (2005) (discussing 
the constitutionality of Regulation Fair Disclosure). 
 253. See supra Part IV.C (discussing the disclosure process under our proposed model 
approach). 
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corporate 
awareness and debate and thereby engender increased disclosure of 
material, private matters prior to the passage of any rule or law.   
regulatory approach that implicates billions of dollars, personal facts of 
powerful executives, privacy rights, and investments of ordinary 
Americans will have a smooth and easy implementation; nor should it.  
Asking someone to disclose to the world a personal ailment, a private 
tragedy, or an intimate fact for the sake of better corporate governance and 
market integrity is not easy, for these are not easy simple issues with 
straight-forward resolutions.  In the end, my hope is that by thinking and 
talking about these issues, we can begin to raise the level of 
